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ABSTRACT
DOUGLAS R. BUCHACEK
“NASHA Pravda, NASHE Delo: The Mobilization of the Nashi Generation in 
Contemporary Russia”
(Under the direction of Robert M. Jenkins)
    This thesis examines the mobilization apparatus of Nashi, a pro-Putin Russian youth 
social movement organization, from its formation in March 2005 to the present.  The 
work explains how the organization orients itself within the socio-political field of 
contemporary Russia and how these orientations allow it to mobilize youths towards 
the achievement of its goals, namely, the support of the political modernization 
program of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the training of the next generation of 
the Russian “elite.”  Three components of Nashi’s mobilization are analyzed: the 
formation of an effective collective identity and ideology; orientations to other actors 
within the socio-political field, with special emphasis placed on its relationship to the 
administration of Vladimir Putin; and interactions with the Russian media.  
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Introduction
    As the second week drew to a close, the rumors began to circulate, and the procession of 
Kremlin-connected speakers, including Vladislav Surkov, Deputy Chief of Staff of the 
Presidential Executive Office and Aide to the President and political strategist Gleb 
Pavlovskii did little to discourage them:  President Vladimir Putin would be next.  While 
attending speeches and political workshops, as well as concerts by pop groups Zemfira and 
B2, the estimated 3,000 “commissars” (komissari)1 gathered at Lake Seliger, near Tver’, for 
Nashi’s2 two week “Seliger-2005” camp anxiously awaited an appearance by the president 
himself.   
    As it turned out, the camp ended without a presidential visit.  However, on 26 July 2005, 
one day after the closing ceremony, 56 commissars arrived at the Zavidovo presidential 
residence outside of Moscow to meet with the president.  For several hours, Putin strolled 
around the presidential grounds with the doe-eyed youths.  “Without a doubt, you will be 
1
 A note about transliteration:  throughout this thesis, I use the Library of Congress standard for transliterating 
Russian into English (http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/russian.pdf).  However, in certain 
instances, such as surnames and the names of organizations found frequently in the press, I defer to 
commonly used spellings.  
2
 “Nashi” roughly translates as “Ours.”  “Nashi” is also the name of a 1991 film by Russian filmmaker and 
politician Aleksandr Nevzorov that defends the actions of the Soviet OMON, the Interior Ministry’s 
paramilitary police force, in the violent dispersal of pro-independence rallies in Lithuania in 1991.  Nevzorov 
declared his intention to create a post-Soviet national identity for Russia.  “Nashi is a circle of people – let it 
be enormous, colossal, multimillions – to whom one is related by common language, blood, and motherland.”  
Quoted in “The Hunt for a National Idea,” by Julian Evans.  Eurasian Home.  31 August 2005. 
http://www.eurasianhome.org/en/?/en/comments/authors/author5/10.  
Despite this rhetorical link and some similarities between Nashi’s ideology and that of Nevzorov, there is no 
known connection between Nevzorov and the youth organization Nashi.
2able to influence the situation in our country,” he told them.  “If you think outside the box, 
then you will be able to help lead the state, the society, and the government.”3
    Though this session received a lot of coverage in the press, it actually was the second 
meeting between Putin and representatives from Nashi, the first having occurred on 30 
May 2005, when 12 commissars met for almost two hours with Putin at the Kremlin.  Such 
direct presidential contact was extraordinary, especially coming fewer than six months 
following Nashi’s official launch by the youth organization “Moving Together” (Idushchie 
Vmeste) on 1 March 2005.  In a matter of months, Nashi had moved from workshops filled 
with enthusiastic youths formulating the organization’s potential slogans (“Forward with 
Russia!” and “We Will Resurrect the Country!” among them) to multiple meetings with the 
very apex of Russian state power.4
    The youth democratic movement Nashi (molodezhnoe demokraticheskoe dvizhenie 
“Nashi”) lists among its goals the protection of Russia from “liberals,” “communists” and 
“fascists,” all of whom Nashi believes threaten the personal freedom of Russian citizens or 
the sovereignty of the Russian state.  The organization’s goal is to help protect the nation 
from such enemies, who seek to dominate and subvert Russia and turn it into the antithesis 
of Nashi’s own ideal: a strong and free country with a market economy and democratic 
institutions.  “A country may not be free while its citizens are oppressed,” the organization 
writes in its manifesto, issued in April 2005.5  Nashi’s self-publications talk a lot about 
whom they oppose, and fit these contemporary struggles within the framework of Russia’s 
3
 “Moskva, 26 Iiulia – Prezident Rossii Vladimir Putin vstretilsia vo vtornik s predstaviteliami molodezhnogo 
dvizheniia “Nashi,”  http://www.nashi.su/smi/93138578.
4
 “‘Our People’ Stand Up for Putin,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/4491633.stm, 4-28-05.
5
 “Manifest molodozhnogo dvizheniia ‘Nashi,’” http://www.nashi.su/pravda/83974709.
3history.  The organization’s manifesto speaks of past glories of the Russian people, notably 
the fight against the Germans in the Second World War, and its determination to resurrect 
Russia and to guarantee its rightful place in the pantheon of nations.6
    In addition to describing whom they are against, the organization pays much attention to 
its own self-perceptions and the affirmative goals that it espouses.  “We are those who 
believe in the future of Russia, and consider her fate to be in our hands,” the organization 
states.  “Every generation has a chance to quit unnoticed, or to change the world.”7  This 
drive to not go unnoticed and to act to affect their nation at the national and local level is 
the message that Nashi’s members championed in 2005, a point the organization continues 
to emphasize.  Nashi claims that it exists to mobilize youths in the defense of Russia from 
harmful influences, as well as to help Russia reclaim its position as a world power, what 
the organization calls Russia’s rightful place at the center of world culture and civilization.8
    But it would be wrong to think of Nashi as simply a social organization ostensibly 
concerned about the future of Russia.  It is decidedly a political organization.  A stated goal 
is for its members to eventually integrate themselves into the political elite and work 
towards what they claim to be essential political “modernization.”  Throughout its brief 
existence, it has enjoyed strong, if indirect and at times unclear, connections to the 
Kremlin.  It is no accident that Vladimir Putin met with Nashi representatives on multiple 
occasions.  The involvement of Vladislav Surkov, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential 
Executive Office and Aide to the President, in Nashi’s activities is especially notable.  Seen 
6
 Ibid.
7
 Ibid.  
8
 Ibid.  
4widely as a patron of the organization, Surkov’s comments about Nashi in the Russian and 
international press have been a major boon to the organization’s standing.  It can be 
deduced that Surkov was heavily involved, if not in the foundation of Nashi, then certainly 
in its promotion and its ability to gain access to the president himself.  
    Vasilii Yakemenko, the 34-year old leader of Nashi, is also important in any analysis of 
the organization and its mobilization success in 2005.  Yakemenko, along with his brother 
Boris, founded Nashi’s antecedent, Moving Together, in 2000, before rolling out Nashi in 
early 2005.  In addition to his involvement with these organizations, Vasilii worked for a 
time in the presidential administration of Vladimir Putin, in the Department for External 
Relations.  While his time at the Kremlin was short-lived, he did develop ties to Surkov, as 
well as to Gleb Pavlovskii, a long-time Kremlin insider, who was instrumental in founding 
the pro-Putin United Russia party.  Such political connections, as I will demonstrate, have 
much to do with the success of Nashi.   
    Forming politically oriented youth organizations was somewhat of a cottage industry in 
Russia in 2005, with Moscow’s mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Sergei Mironov, Chairman of the 
Federation Council of the Russian Federation and cofounder of the Russian Party of Life, 
among those who entered the fray.9  Youth wings of established parties across the political 
spectrum mobilized young people to rallies, demonstrations and other events.  The National 
Bolsheviks (Natsional-Bol’sheviki) deployed members in several attention-grabbing stunts 
throughout the year.  The United Russia party founded a new version of its youth wing, 
replacing Youth Unity with the new, “anti-racist” Young Guards (Molodaia Gvardiia).  
9
 Schreck, Carl, “Luzhkov Aims to Harness City’s Soccer Fandom,” Moscow Times, 23 August 2005; 
Boykewich, Stephen, “Mironov’s Power of Life Criticizes Nashi,” Moscow Times, 29 August 2005.
5    However, it was Nashi that drew the most attention, and for good reason.  A spin-off 
(some might say mutation) of Moving Together, Nashi managed to recruit upwards of 
50,000 participants for a rally in May 2005 commemorating the 60th anniversary of the end 
of the Great Patriotic War.10  The “Our Victory” (Nasha Pobeda) rally and the Seliger-
2005 camp were the two major events the young organization staged, but many of its 
actions were less ambitious.  Although the rallies grab the headlines, Nashi’s everyday 
activities included working with orphanages and performing social work in the pattern of 
the Soviet subbotnik, a day of volunteer labor spent cleaning parks or schools.  A 
component of its program was oriented around educating its members as to practices and 
strategies for organizing Nashi’s future activities, as well the development of leadership 
skills.  In all, after its first year of existence, Nashi can claim chapters in twenty-two 
Russian cities.  While the events that garnered the most attention in 2005 were those 
organized at a national level, much of Nashi’s activity took place in local chapters, a 
characteristic that continues to this day.
    The success of Nashi in mobilizing11 large numbers of youths on the national and local 
scale is due in part to the efficacy of its tactics, rhetoric and image in capturing the 
attention of Russian young people, whose interest in the political process is hard to 
pinpoint.  A study conducted in 2004 on the eve of the presidential elections offers insight 
into the political attitudes possessed by Russian young people aged 16-34.  Among the 
10
 “Moskva: ‘Nashi’ v gorode,” http://www.nashi.su/smi/86724533.
11
 In general, when I refer to “mobilization” in this thesis, I am referring to an organization’s ability to attract 
participants to its given activities and the processes through which this participation is achieved.  
“Mobilization” in the field of social movement and collective action scholarship also refers to “the process by 
which a group secures collective control over the resources needed for collective action.”  Jenkins, J. Craig, 
“Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements.”  Annual Review of Sociology, 9 1983, 
532.  
6findings was that youths tend not to participate in regional elections, though that does not 
hold true for presidential contests.  The poll, conducted by the All-Russian Center for the 
Study of Public Opinion (Vserossiiskii Tsentr Izucheniia Obshchestvennogo Mneniia), 
indicated that 73 percent planned to vote in the presidential election, whereas only 47 
percent intended to vote in the local contests.12  In fact, 57 percent of young people aged 18 
to 35 voted in the presidential contest, compared to 42 percent in the parliamentary 
elections of December 2003.13  Despite a willingness to vote on the national level, this 
participation does not correlate with widespread support for Russia’s established political 
parties.  When asked “which political party is closest to your views,” the party that fared 
the best in the poll was United Russia, which polled 20 percent of the respondents.  A 
greater percentage (23 percent) replied “difficult to say,” while 25 percent simply said 
“none.”14
    While Russian youths tend to be suspicious of parties, other political entities fare better.  
Eighty-two percent of respondents viewed Vladimir Putin favorably, while the president’s 
administration and “state institutions” also fared well, with 58 percent and 57 percent 
respectively.15  The political profile of Russian youth from this data indicates an interest in 
the political process, though the traditional avenues for direct, active involvement beyond 
simply voting - political parties - hardly seem to be garnering their support.  Despite the 
presence of youth wings, political parties in the early 2000s failed to recruit youths into the 
12
 Zorkaia, Natalia and Nadia M. Diuk, “Values and Attitudes of Young Russians.” Russian Social Science 
Review, 45:5 September-October 2004, 15.
13
 FOM: Public Opinion Foundation (Russia), 
http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/civil_society/elections/presidential_elections/voter_turn_2004/ed0
41231 
14
 Zorkaia and Diuk, 14.
15
 Diuk, Nadia. “The Next Generation.”  Journal of Democracy, 15:3 July 2004, 61; Zorkaia and Diuk, 12.
7wider activity of the party organization.  While political parties experienced difficulties 
attracting the participation and loyalty of youth in contemporary Russia, youth-oriented 
social movement organizations in general, and Nashi in particular, had success in 
mobilizing large numbers of participants.  The question, then, is why was Nashi able to 
attract the interest and participation of young Russians?  What mechanisms did it exploit 
for mobilization?  What do these mechanisms suggest about the current social and political 
situation in Russia?      
    Social scientists examining organizations such as Nashi look at several factors that can 
contribute to an organization’s ability to mobilize individual actors to advance its aims.  I 
wish to examine Nashi’s use of these mobilizing mechanisms in an effort to understand not 
only Nashi itself, its genesis, its evolution, and its prospects for continued activity, but also 
its place within the wider socio-political field of contemporary Russia.  By analyzing 
Nashi, and the actors with which it interacts, I hope to shed light on the current social and 
political situation in Russia, as well understand some of the trends in Russian politics as we 
approach the 2008 presidential election.  An examination of Nashi, due to the relations it 
has with several actors within contemporary Russian politics and its own tactics and 
rhetoric, allows for a discussion of power relations, post-Soviet identity, and media 
development, among other topics of analysis.  Nashi’s apparent success in 2005 at the 
expense of party-related youth organizations points to deficiencies in that system of youth 
political socialization.  In short, an analysis of Nashi allows for a broad discussion of 
contemporary social and political life during the Putin Administration in 2005.    
    Before I undertake this discussion, I will sketch out a framework for analysis that 
emphasizes Nashi’s location within a complex and multi-polar action system of 
8interrelations between actors in the social and political field. My first task is to define some 
terms.  I consider Nashi to be a “social movement organization” that seizes upon claims 
made by a larger “social movement,” and orients itself primarily towards the political field 
of Russian society.  Nashi executes a variety of activities in order to achieve its goals, some 
of which are large-scale public mass-actions, and some of which are smaller, less 
publicized activities open only to its members.  All of these activities however can be 
considered “collective action.”  Nashi is a social movement organization that organizes 
collective action to achieve its goals, which are consistent with a broader social movement.  
    As McCarthy and Zald write, “a social movement is a set of opinions and beliefs in a 
population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure 
and/or reward distribution of a society” upon which individuals at times act in a more or 
less organized manner.16  Actors within a social movement work towards those ends in a 
variety of ways, some collective, and some individual.  One way through which many 
individuals act together to achieve these ends is through a “social movement organization.”  
A social movement organization “is a complex, or formal, organization,” which identifies 
with aspects of the social movement and organizes individuals to achieve those changes in 
social structure or reward distribution in society.17  Social movement organization activity 
is not the only way in which individuals act in concert to achieve the ends of a social 
movement.  Any action in which multiple individuals act in concert is “collective action.”  
Collective action is a phenomenon in which “a number of individuals [exhibit], at the same 
16
 McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.”  
The American Journal of Sociology 82:6 May 1977, 1217-8.
17
 Ibid. 1218.
9time and place, behavior with relatively similar morphological characteristics.”18  While 
“collective action” is a term that may certainly apply to social movement organizations, it 
is incorrect to suggest that collective action always refers to social movements or social 
movement organizations.  Collective action is a tool employed by a social movement 
organization to achieve the ends and goals of the social movement.  The broader field of 
social movement theory in part seeks to examine the motives, structures, actors and 
relationships between actors in social movements.  
    In analyses of social movement organizations, social scientists focus on an 
organization’s actions within “a field of opportunities and constraints”19 and the 
organization’s relationships to its “constituents,” “adherents,” the “bystander public,” and 
its “opponents,”20  as well as the organization’s ability to operate in a field of limited 
monetary and human resources.  These “opportunities and constraints” include an 
organization’s relationship to the state; the media and other actors within political society, 
18
 Melucci, Alberto.  Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary 
Society.  John Keane and Paul Mier, eds.  Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989, 18.
19
 “Opportunities and constraints,” is a term Melucci uses to explain the assets and liabilities possessed by 
actors participating in collective action.  For the purposes of this thesis, I use “opportunities and constraints” 
to represent the factors that aid a social movement organization’s ability to mobilize, or hinder the same.  
These factors can be created by the organization, such as its collective identity, or it can be exogenous, as in a 
political or social event that make an organization salient or, alternatively, irrelevant.  A social movement 
organization’s activity in the “field of opportunities and constraints” represents the organization’s ability to 
operate within the parameters set by these opportunities and constraints.
20
 McCarthy and Zald, 1221.  McCarthy and Zald use these terms to classify actors in mobilization efforts of 
social movement organizations.  I differ somewhat from their definitions.  For the purposes of this thesis, I 
will define “constituents” as youths aged 16 and above to whom Nashi targets its recruitment; “adherents” as 
those constituents who have adopted Nashi’s ideals as their own, and participate in Nashi’s activities; and the 
“bystander public” is individuals who are not targets of Nashi’s recruitment efforts, but whom Nashi still 
seeks to influence.  At the very least, Nashi hopes not to alienate the bystander public from its activities.  
“Opponents” can be constituents who disagree with Nashi’s goals and/or activities, and seek to combat their 
influence, either through social movement organizations or other means.  In competition for constituents, 
however, “opponents” refers to youth social movement organizations that are hostile to Nashi’s stated goals.  
Nashi also competes for resources and constituents with social movement organizations that share some or all 
of Nashi’s stated goals and ideologies.  A good example of this is Molodaia Gvardiia, the newly reformed 
youth wing of the United Russia party.  While these two organizations share many of the same goals, they do 
compete for limited resources and constituents.
10
the political opportunity available at the time; and the motivational mechanisms employed 
to mobilize individuals to participate in such collective action.  A social movement 
organization works to position itself with regard to other actors within this field of 
opportunities and constraints in such a way as to maximize the positive influence these 
actors can have on its mobilizing structures and the advancement of its stated goals and 
minimize the negative effects.  Likewise, these other actors treat social movement 
organizations in a similar manner, negotiating with, embracing or opposing a social 
movement organization depending on their own needs and advantages.  
    A far as mobilization is concerned, it is important to remember that Nashi does not exist 
in a vacuum.  The field in which Nashi operates is populated by a host of activities, 
organizations and events that compete for loyalty and participation of the populace.  
Nashi’s competition consists of not only rival youth social movement organizations, but 
also non-political, non-social outlets, or even stasis – participation in nothing at all.  
Nashi’s task is twofold: mobilize youths to act in the socio-political field, and then draw 
them into their own organization.  
    An organization interacts with members of the four classifications of individuals and 
actors -- constituents, adherents, the bystander public, and opponents -- in different ways.  
It seeks to convert non-adherent constituents into adherents.  It seeks to expand the 
participation of adherents, transferring the low-risk “unspecialized labor of supporters” into 
more involved work within the organization.21  Finally, it seeks to engage the bystander 
public, who “are not opponents” of the movement, but who merely “witness social 
21
 Jenkins, 533.
11
movement activity.”22  An organization must complete this negotiation while mitigating the 
effects of its opponents -- opposing social movement organizations who seek to influence a 
similar constituent pool, or individuals hostile to its stated aims and goals -- who seek the 
same pool of limited resources.23
    Taken together, the study of social movements and collective action seeks to explain 
why and how individuals who are not making contentious claims – that is, seeking to 
achieve a certain political or social goal -- begin to do so by examining the methods of 
various organizations and groups, as well as the context in which those organizations and 
individuals reside.24  The success of a social movement organization is also based upon its 
ability to develop “purposeful orientations” within the field of opportunities and constraints 
and exploit these orientations to attract participants.25
    In this thesis, I examine Nashi using frameworks provided by scholarship on social 
movement organizations and collective action.  My purpose is twofold.  First, I wish to 
provide a description of Nashi and its activities.  While Nashi garnered much attention in 
the Russian press in 2005 and sparked debate and discussion amongst observers of the 
Russian socio-political scene, little is known about it among the English-speaking 
audience.  I wish to add such a description of Nashi to the literature.  Moreover, Nashi has 
not been the subject of academic analysis, and this examination will be the second 
component of this thesis.  Using the frameworks provided by scholarship on social 
22
 McCarthy and Zald, 1221.
23
 Ibid. 1221.  
24
 McAdam, Douglas, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly.  Dynamics of Contention.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, 34.
25
 Melucci, 25.
12
movement organizations and collective action, I will argue that Nashi’s ability to mobilize 
successfully, in contrast to other Russian youth social movement organizations in 2005, 
was due to its ability to maximize its advantages and minimize its liabilities within the field 
of opportunities and constraints. I seek to do this by examining 1) Nashi’s goals and tactics 
and creation of a unifying collective identity among its participants; 2) its relationship to 
other actors within the field of opportunities and constraints; and 3) its interactions with the 
Russian press, a means through which social movement organizations inform “elites and 
mass publics” about its actions, as well as form positive “morale and self-image.”26
    In Chapter One I discuss Nashi’s ideology, its stated goals, its organizational structure, 
and the relationship between its rhetoric and actions.  Nashi is a young organization; while 
many of the press accounts of the organization and its activities gave quick summaries of 
its ideological program and identity, a full discussion has not been conducted.  I wish to 
add to the literature an in-depth discussion of its rhetoric, symbolism, and ideology and 
discuss how these components of the organization enable it to “communicate, negotiate and 
make decisions” about how, when, and for what purpose to act.27  I will examine this 
collective identity to posit how Nashi was able to create the emotional investment amongst 
its members to mobilize them to the organization’s events in 2005.  Much of this analysis 
will come from Nashi’s own publications: its press releases, manifestos, and websites, as 
well as its activities and events.  I will pay close attention to the tactics it used to create 
perceptions of itself within the organization, strategies on which the organization still 
relies.  How does Nashi perceive itself?  What does it do to further those perceptions?  
26
 Jenkins, 546.
27
 Melucci, 35.
13
How did those perceptions attract participants?  How do these perceptions work to mobilize 
youths under Nashi’s banner?  What is the breakdown of Nashi’s federalized structure, and 
how does this division serve the mobilizing mechanisms of the organization?
    In Chapter Two, I will examine Nashi’s relationship to a multitude of actors within the 
wider socio-political field.  I seek to explain how Nashi oriented itself towards other actors, 
and how these orientations aided its mobilization and activity.  This discussion also seeks 
to explain why Moving Together, Nashi’s antecedent, ceased to be relevant to the wider 
socio-political field, despite its apparent strength between 2000 and 2003.  Analyzing 
Moving Together’s missteps and Nashi’s apparent correction of these deficiencies will shed 
light on the ways that a social movement organization can navigate the socio-political field 
to aid its ability to redress the grievances of the movement with which it is associated.  This 
theme of comparing Nashi to Moving Together will be apparent throughout this thesis, as it 
allows for a cogent and clear discussion of the opportunities and pitfalls for a social 
movement organization as it orients itself to other actors within the socio -political field.
    A key component of this discussion will be the effect that outside events can have on an 
organization’s ability to operate and mobilize its adherents to collective action to 
accomplish its goals.  These environmental factors, such as political events, can hinder a 
social movement organization’s efficacy or they can aid in its mobilization.  How do such 
events aid or inhibit a social movement organization such as Nashi?  How do these factors 
alter political opportunity?  How did Nashi seize upon the opportunities afforded to it by 
outside events?  I will demonstrate how such factors led to Moving Together’s loss of 
momentum, and how Nashi sought to design its programs to address those deficiencies.
14
    After this discussion, I will turn to Nashi’s relationship with other actors in the socio-
political field.  Much was made of Nashi’s supposed relationship with Putin’s Kremlin.  At 
the very least, there was tacit support for Nashi in the Putin Administration, notably in the 
visible presence of Surkov in Nashi’s activities.  How did these relationships aid or inhibit 
Nashi’s activities?  How did these relationships attract participants?  Why did Moving 
Together cease to be the mobilizing powerhouse that it once was and give way to Nashi, an 
organization which is in some ways is similar and in others quite different?  What did the 
state have to gain from its support of Nashi’s activities?  More importantly, how did Nashi 
negotiate among other actors in the field of opportunities and constraints to mobilize 
Russian youths?  What does Nashi’s relationship to the state say about the socio-political 
situation in Russia in 2005?  What does this relationship indicate about Nashi’s and the 
state’s relations to the environment in which they reside?  
    Nashi’s connection with the state is especially interesting from the social movement 
organization perspective, given Nashi’s support for the political and social program of 
Putin’s Russia.  Generalized characterizations of social movement organizations --
especially youth organizations -- vis-à-vis the state tend to stress their oppositional nature.  
However, Nashi is far from an oppositional organization.  As I will demonstrate below, it 
positions itself as an enthusiastic supporter of the current regime, and explicitly states that 
it is in favor of the status quo, with some caveats.  The language Nashi uses in explaining 
whom they are against focuses on nameless “bureaucrats,” “oligarchs” and “fascists” 
whom they perceive to be sabotaging the program put forth by Putin.  Rather than call for a 
change of the existing order, Nashi hopes to cleanse the current system of the detritus that 
threatens the positive program put forth by the government.  A discussion then of Nashi’s 
15
goals concerning the state, and the reciprocal goals of the state towards Nashi should be the 
subject of inquiry.    
    I will tackle the section relating to Nashi’s orientations and relationships with actors 
within the socio-political field by examining Nashi’s own publications.  Additionally, I will 
use press coverage from Russian and non-Russian outlets to examine these relationships.  
While it is true that Nashi is a young organization, press coverage of it was widespread in 
2005. 
 I will also examine the relationship between Nashi’s founder and leader, Vasilii 
Yakemenko, and Vladislav Surkov.  Both Yakemenko and Surkov played a role in the 
creation and propagation of Nashi, and the proximity of them to Putin indicates a close 
relationship between Nashi and the highest levels of the Russian government.  This 
intersection of personalities is also an intersection of Nashi’s activities and those of the 
state.  By looking at this relationship, I hope to shed some light on the interactive
relationship not only between these two men, but also between Nashi and Putin’s 
government.
    For my third chapter, I will consider Russian press coverage of the organization and the 
interactions between Nashi and various press outlets in 2005.  The importance of the press 
in a social movement organization’s efforts to mobilize participants and negotiate its claims 
cannot be overstated.28  A social movement organization has the ability to market itself in 
order to create the desired mobilization factors; however, this ability is limited in scope.  
Once an organization’s publicity needs have developed beyond simple word of mouth, it 
depends upon the media to disseminate information about its activities and actions in order 
28
 Marx, Gary T. and Douglas McAdam.  Collective Behavior and Social Movements: Process and Structure.
Englewood Cliff, NJ:  Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1994, 104-105.
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to help advance its claims.  The press allows an organization to attract a larger audience.  
Favorable or unfavorable coverage can have a great effect on the efficacy of a movement. 
It is important to consider here the wider context that press coverage plays in this socio-
political field.  The media can alternately aid and inhibit a social movement organization’s 
ability to convey its message to constituents and the bystander public.  How much 
importance does Nashi place on the media?  How does it interact with media outlets?  What 
are the motives of various Russian newspapers in reporting positively or negatively on 
Nashi’s activities?  How does Nashi contend with negative portrayal?  What does Nashi’s 
relationship with the media say about its orientations within the socio-political field?  How 
do the actions the organization takes relate to its understanding of the effect media 
coverage can have on a social movement organization?    
Nashi is a young organization to be sure, and while its activities in 2005 garnered much 
attention, it is certainly possible that, like its predecessor Moving Together, it will be 
unable to sustain this momentum.  Regardless of Nashi’s future, which I will discuss in my 
conclusion, an analysis of its rhetoric, ideology and activities, its interactions within the 
socio-political field, and its media relations is important to the discussion of social and 
political life in contemporary Russia.  A close analysis of a social movement organization 
offers insight into power relations, popular sentiment, and political participation in a 
society.  An examination of Nashi allows for a discussion of these factors, among others, 
within the social and political context of Russia under Vladimir Putin.  I am confident that 
this contribution to the literature on youth political activity and contemporary Russian 
politics will be a useful one.
Chapter 1 – Formation, Goals and Tactics: Nashi’s Mobilizing Structures
“Moving Together was unsuccessful because… you don’t build anything serious on profit 
alone.  Money, of course, is important, but only after ideology.  And to find ideologically 
suitable people, you have to start by putting the finishing touches on that ideology, and to 
transmit that marketing strategy while searching for young people who share that 
ideology.”
-- Viktor Militarev, Vice President, Institute of National Strategy29
    A key component in the success of a social movement organization is its ability to form 
a coherent ideology30 and identity among its participants.  A movement organization’s 
ability to mobilize its adherents and convert constituents rests partly on the “collective 
incentives” that an organization creates and manipulates.31  By doing this, a structurally 
successful organization is able to conflate the self-interest and “internalized values and 
sentiment” of its constituents with the goals of the movement and the organization.32  This 
ideology, identity, and conflation are recruitment mechanisms to attract new participants, 
as well as transfer low-activity participants into positions within the organization with 
29
 “Novoe molodezhnoe dvizhenie dolzhno stat’ siloi, kotoraia budet protivostoiat’ revoliutsii;” 
http://www.kreml.org/interview/80191430.
30
 “Ideology” for the purposes of this thesis refers to an interpretive framework that a social movement 
organization uses to approach the world in which it resides.  A social movement organization uses this 
ideology to frame its assertions, actions and goals.  Nashi uses the Russian word ideologiia throughout its 
manifesto.
31
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greater responsibility and commitment.  An organization’s first task then is to create 
identity.  While scholarship on collective action discusses many forms of identity formation 
vis-à-vis mobilization, one action of particular importance is the usefulness of appealing to 
an existing identity in order to mobilize a new group of actors.  As McAdam et al. write, 
“while new identities emerge during contentious episodes, most individuals initially join 
the fray through interactive appeals to, and successful appropriation of, existing 
identities.”33  Furthermore, movement organizations that focus on “purposive and solidarity 
incentives,” “preexisting or ‘natural’ groups,” and “linking the vision of change to 
preexisting group culture” tend to be more effective.34  All of these tactics represent the 
formation of a collective identity that bonds participants together through a combination of 
self-interest and internalization of a group’s ideological goals, and the creation of an
emotional investment, which “enables individuals to recognize themselves in each other.”35
    Nashi’s immediate ability to offer an appealing coherent ideology, which I will discuss 
below, is partly the result of its growth out of the Moving Together organization.  Nashi’s 
leaders announced its formation via a press release issued through the Moving Together 
website, and that organization’s leader, Vasilii Yakemenko, was immediately elected to 
take the helm of Nashi.  It was because of this relationship that Nashi was able to achieve a 
running start.  In many ways, Nashi is a retooled Moving Together, its leadership able to 
build on the success of that movement in mobilizing Russian youths while having learned 
from its mistakes.36  Moving Together’s ability to attract attention to its often outrageous 
33
 McAdam et al.; 56.
34
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36
 I will discuss Moving Together’s transition to Nashi in greater detail on pages 48-52.
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activities in many ways made it a victim of its own successes.  For every mass rally in 
support of Putin it organized, there was the negative coverage generated by its more 
controversial cultural crusades, such as when members gathered in Moscow in June 2002 
to publicly destroy copies of novels by Vladimir Sorokin, an event Vladislav Surkov 
labeled “disgusting.”37  Even among sympathetic audiences, Moving Together’s choice of 
tactics caused unease.  
    But even more so, Moving Together was ideologically weak.  With so much of its focus 
aimed at the lionization of Putin, its ideology was reduced to a single man. Militarev, the 
Vice President of the Institute of National Strategy, and a Russian political analyst,
characterized it as “Putin is our president and Putin is always right.”38  Nashi’s early 
success, and its ability to immediately form a coherent ideology, suggests its leaders agreed 
with Militarev’s critique.39  While Nashi were as unabashedly pro-Putin as Moving 
Together, it defined its goals in less concrete terms, aligning itself not with the fortunes of 
one president, but with a broader -- even romantic -- vision of nation.  I will argue that 
Nashi’s formation of ideology and its construction of a collective identity represent a key 
37
 “A Talk with Putin’s Inside Man,” Business Week Online, 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/oct2002/nf20021021_0216.htm.
38
 “Novoe molodezhnoe dvizhenie dolzhno stat’ siloi, kotoraia budet protivostoiat’ revoliutsii;” 
http://www.kreml.org/interview/80191430; Yakemenko defended the heavy Putin stress in 2001 when he said 
that a “movement, especially a youth movement, needs certain things: there should be a leader…an idol.  And 
without Putin, the creation of such a movement was unrealistic.  There was no unifying figure.”  When 
pressed about what would happen to Moving Together if Putin were to resign, a somewhat flustered 
Yakemenko replied, “Putin, whether or not he resigns, will remain in our hearts.  The president will go, but 
the people will remain.” Quoted in Corwin, Julie A. “Russia: ‘A Youth Movement Needs A Leader.’” Radio 
Free Liberty.  21 April 2005.  http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticleprint/2005/04/9ea4ff48-d348-4624-8203-
64cf632aae48.html.  
39
 This immediacy also suggests that Moving Together’s weaknesses were well known and that an alternative 
organization was being organized, despite Yakemenko’s statements as late as February 2005 to the contrary.  
See Corwin, Julie A., “Analysis: Walking With Putin,” Radio Free Liberty, 2 March 2005.  
http://www.ncsj.org/AuxPages/030205RFERL_Putin.shtml. 
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source of its success, and this ideology and identity are inherent in its choice of symbols 
and tactics.  I will detail in this chapter Nashi’s self-perceptions, and illustrate how Nashi’s 
choice of tactics served those goals in 2005.  
    In order to provide the context in which Nashi conducts its activities, at both the local 
and the national level, I examine a particularly important tract that Nashi has published: its 
manifesto (“manifest molodezhnogo dvizheniia NASHI”).  This document describes the 
world in which Nashi places itself, and defines who it is, whom it is against, and where it 
intends to go -- or as Nashi sees it, where it intends to take Russia.   Nashi’s manifesto is a 
call to arms, detailing the problems and the potential solutions Nashi makes its mission to 
provide.  The document provides Nashi’s ideological raison d’etre.  Analyzing its contents 
will provide insight into the motivational factors behind its tactics.
    Nashi published the manifesto in a section of its website called “Our Truth.”40 The 
document, the organization claimed, was the product of discussion clubs and conferences, 
which Nashi organized prior to its unveiling on 15 April 2005 at the first National Congress 
of Delegates, held at the Moscow Academy of Sciences.41  It is in “Our Truth” that Nashi 
outlines the main components of its activities at the national level.  In addition to 
ideological tracts such as the manifesto, Nashi includes accounts of their Our Victory 
events, as well as published statements of several of the organization’s national commissars 
about the purpose of the organization.  Additionally, this section includes instructions on 
how to become a member of Nashi.  The themes detailed in these documents -- among 
40
 “Nasha Pravda,” or “NASHA Pravda” as written on their website; the organization capitalizes every form 
of the Russian word “nash” in the documents published on their website.
41
 “NASH komissar Mikhail Kulikov: Pora rasstavit’ vse tochki nad ‘i!’”  
http://www.nashi.su/pravda/85865531
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them patriotism, respect for history, the generational component emphasized in their 
reverence of World War II veterans, and their self-defined mission to save Russia for future 
generations -- highlight what Nashi deems the most important facets of their organization 
and the prism through which their activities should be viewed.
A.  Manifest Molodezhnogo Dvizheniia “NASHI”
Nashi’s manifesto is an amalgamation of diagnosis and prescription, placing 
contemporary Russia within a historical context while speculating on the various paths that 
the nation might take, whether as a result of their action, or their failure to act.  As a 
document, it has several functions, the first of which is this contextualization.  It also 
defines the world in which Russia existed in 2005.  It outlines an idealized version of 
Russia, which Nashi makes its mission to realize; it describes the obstacles in the way of 
that realization; it illustrates the process through which such realization will be achieved; 
and it outlines Nashi’s role within that process.  The final section outlines the specific 
actions Nashi proposed to take to realize this transformation of Russia into “the country of 
our dreams.”42  I will ask the reader to bear with me as I dissect this document, as it is a 
blueprint for the entire organization.  All of Nashi’s activities have their genesis in this 
document, and it is impossible to fully understand and evaluate Nashi without a rigorous 
discussion of the manifesto.  
    In addition to these diagnoses and prescriptions, Nashi’s manifesto is a document that 
defines identities.  It frames who Nashi is, whom it is against, and from whom the 
42
 “Manifest molodozhnogo dvizheniia ‘Nashi,’” http://www.nashi.su/pravda/83974709.
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organization descends. What are these identities?  How does the deployment of these 
identities encourage those who are not making contentious claims to do so?  How does 
Nashi frame its actions?  In its manifesto, the organization does this by appealing to the 
emotions brought about by the Russian reverence of the World War II generation, an 
appeal that, to be sure, was also employed by the Soviets in the decades following the 
conflict.  
    The Great Patriotic War is the pivot in the discussion of three cataclysmic events that 
Nashi cites as the major events of the Twentieth Century, all of which either established a 
value that Nashi embraces or created a conflict that Nashi works to resolve.  These three 
events are the October Revolution, the Great Patriotic War, and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  In addition to being three events that continue to have an effect on the psyche of 
contemporary Russia, these events also introduce a generational component to the 
discussion that Nashi seeks to use for its advantage.  Each of these events, Nashi suggests, 
offered a challenge to successive generations, with varying results.  The October 
Revolution, “the worldwide political event of the Twentieth Century,”43 introduced the 
values of social justice and equal opportunity for all the world, Nashi argues, a 
development which was forever tainted by the early Soviets’ (or the generation of Nashi’s 
great-grandparents) failure to account for the importance of  personal freedom in social 
development.  Thus, in the final analysis, this generation failed, and as a result, 
communism brought to Russia an “economic and political dead-end” and stunted 
modernization.44
43
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    While Nashi’s manifesto contends that this generation failed, the same cannot be said 
about the following generation, the grandparents of Nashi’s members.  Though the Soviet 
government was incapable of initiating true modernization, Russia was still able to defeat 
Germany.  Nashi’s primary goal in invoking the generation that fought the Great Patriotic 
War is to stress the importance of generational responsibility.  This is a theme that the 
organization comes back to repeatedly.  Today’s generation of young people has an 
obligation to defend the sovereignty of the Russian nation “like our grandfathers did sixty 
years ago.”  Moreover, it follows that “a renunciation of responsibility is a renunciation of 
freedom,” the implication being that the World War II generation had taken responsibility 
for defeating Russia’s enemies and safeguarding freedom, and that theirs must likewise do 
so.45
    The Russian victory in World War II was a victory for the idea of national 
determination.  Having defeated the hegemonic colonial power of Nazi Germany, Russia 
guaranteed the sanctity of values such as self-determination and “the right of every people 
to free development.”46  However, though the defense of national self-determination was 
the World War II generation’s gift to the world, such a gift was squandered by the 
generation that followed, in part due to the deficiencies of the economic and political 
system created by the Soviets, and in part because the succeeding generation (that of 
Nashi’s parents) failed to take responsibility for guiding the ship of state.  The generation 
of Nashi’s parents “has lost faith in Russia and her perspectives.”  Many looked to the West 
45
 Ibid.
46
 Ibid.  It is worth mentioning that while Nashi is ready to admit certain failures of the Soviet government as 
it relates to modernization, it curiously fails to mention Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe when bemoaning 
the “colonial” and “hegemonic” impulses of which the Nazis were guilty.
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to provide a model for post-Soviet Russian economics and politics, a move Nashi derides 
as “facsimile” and a failure to take responsibility for their own country.  Nashi suggests 
that such a rejection of “historical responsibility” by a generation of “defeatists” led to a 
“crisis of Russian statehood” and a society that is “disintegrating,” whose hallmarks are 
“the destruction of common values,” the “growth of distrust and indifference towards each 
other,” and “a weakening of the ethical norms and standards,” which has led to a weak state 
plagued by corruption.47
    Russia in crisis is foundering, Nashi suggests, and this is a potentially fatal development.  
Because of Russia’s geographical location, it is surrounded by rival powers.  With such a 
weak state, Russia is as vulnerable to outside enemies today, as it was in the past, when 
Hitler and Napoleon sought to conquer her.  Additionally, Russia’s post-Soviet situation is 
analogous to the Times of Troubles, the period following the death of Ivan the Terrible, 
when there was crisis of Russian state leadership and a vulnerability to outside influence 
and corruption on a weakened Russian state.  Nashi contends that following independence 
from Soviet domination, Russia was in a position to complete the modernizing task ignored 
by the Soviets; however, due to “defeatists,” what evolved was nothing more than 
“oligarchic capitalism” aided and abetted by an economic, political and cultural elite who 
declined to take responsibility for the future of Russia, replacing the False Dmitris of the 
Times of Troubles with the false promises of Westernization, or alternatively, extremism.
    The nature of the opponents, Nashi argues, is as confusing as the times.  Much of 
Nashi’s comments about its political opponents in the press in 2005 centered around a 
seeming conflation of all opposition under the rubric of “fascism,” ignoring the political 
47
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and philosophical differences between groups and individuals Nashi singled out for 
derision that make unity a difficult and improbable enterprise.  Nashi recognizes the 
somewhat troublesome nature of this banner definition in it manifesto, but solves the 
problem by declaring this opposition to be the result of “an unnatural union” which consists 
of “liberals and fascists, Westernizers and ultranationalists, international money and 
international terrorists.”  The constituent components of this union seek to take Russia 
down an equally unnatural path towards Western “facsimile,” or look to take advantage of 
the “societal chaos” that occurred during the 1990s for their own nefarious ends.
    What is the glue that holds together such an unlikely group?  Nashi lists the supposed 
benefits each interest group gains by fostering Russia’s instability, but likewise implies that 
they act in a concerted manner.  If this is the case, why and how do they act together?  
What rallies this “unnatural union” to put aside its many differences to act in concert across 
ideological lines?  The answer is simple:  Vladimir Putin.  As I wrote earlier, Nashi is as 
unabashedly pro-Putin as Moving Together was.  Where Nashi differs is in how Putin fits 
into their wider ideology.  As Militarev scoffed, much of Moving Together’s ideology 
could be reduced to “Putin is our president and Putin is always right.”  Nashi takes a more 
nuanced approach.  The organization is quick to define its support for Putin not in terms of 
“Putin the individual, but the support of his political course,” which is “directed towards 
the protection of the sovereignty of the country,” and concerned with economic and 
political modernization, which will provide “stable, non-violent development, [and] the 
achievement of [Russia’s] future global leadership.”48
48
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    If Putin is the greatest challenge facing this unnatural union, where does Nashi fit into 
the equation?  What is its role?  Nashi believes that without its help, the Putin revolution 
will “peter out.”  “The efforts of one person,” the organization writes, “are not enough” to 
affect the change necessary to right the Russian ship of state.  The enormity of the task, 
coupled with the “rabid resistance” from “internal and external opponents” makes it 
imperative that Putin receive concerted support.  And who would be better to aid in this 
battle than the young generation, those who have the most at stake, those who are 
“historically responsible” for seizing the initiative in the defense of Russia, just as their 
grandfathers did during the Great Patriotic War?  “The future of our country is our future,” 
the organization writes.  Russian youth are the “most concerned” party in the future 
modernization of the country.  The Putin revolution is therefore Nashi’s revolution.
    If the Nashi generation is one that is prepared to take “historical responsibility” to free 
Russia from this unnatural union and lead Russia to its rightful place in the pantheon of 
nations, how exactly do they envision that place to be?  What is the “country of our 
dreams?”   First of all, it is a stable country.  Though Nashi talks about “revolution,” the 
organization is careful to stress that it does not intend to overthrow the existing 
government.  The Nashi revolution will be “a revolution in content, but not in form.”  “Our 
task is to strive for dynamic changes” and encourage a revolution in governing that will 
enact “modernization.”  The organization’s tools will be “our initiative and energy.”  “[It] 
does not follow that we must demolish the existing government” Nashi stresses.  
“[p]olitical stabilization is the most important condition for the economic development of 
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the country.”  Demolishing the existing government would interrupt political stability, 
which, coupled with a weakened state and society, may be catastrophic.49
    I will discuss below how Nashi intends to carry out its “revolution in content.”  First, I 
wish to talk more about what that revolution will bring.  I have already discussed Nashi’s 
perception of its enemies, and how that point of view relates to the overarching sense of 
history the organization injects into its manifesto.  I will now sketch out Nashi’s goals, in 
an ideological sense.  What is the Russia “of our dreams,” apart from the assertion that it is 
the opposite of what liberals, fascists and oligarchs wish to construct?  If Putin, with the 
help of Nashi, succeeds, what will Russia look like?  What values will it embrace?  
    In its historical sketch, Nashi writes that the October Revolution, despite its numerous 
negatives, introduced the notions of equality and social justice to Russia.  Moreover, 
despite the excesses of the Soviets and a distinct lack of respect for personal freedom, the 
Russian people still answered the call to defend Russia from outside invaders and in the 
process guaranteed the rights of nations to self-determination.  In viewing the past, Nashi 
sees that actors at different times have made a choice between having a strong state, and 
respecting the importance of this personal liberty.  “Communists and fascists are ready to 
sacrifice personal freedom of citizens for the sake of achieving a great state,” whereas 
liberals value personal freedom but at the expense of a strong state.  Nashi sees this as a 
false choice.  “Personal freedom and national sovereignty are two sides of the same coin,” 
they write.  “The two sides…are indivisible.  A man may not be free if his country is 
oppressed.  A country may not be free while its people are oppressed.”  
49
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    What are the other values Nashi hopes to instill?  In addition to personal freedom and 
national sovereignty, Nashi places a great importance on “fairness.”  “Fairness is when a 
young and talented person from the most far-flung village has the chance to receive an 
education in the best institute of higher learning,” Nashi writes.  However, “it is not fair” 
for “a loafer” to receive a publicly funded education because of bribery, or another form of 
corruption.  The state should be supportive of those members of society who work hard and 
still have fallen on hard times, yet “it is not a fair society that helps a young drunk who is 
living on the bill of his pensioner parents.”  Nashi draws a line between those who take 
advantage of social programs and subsidies and the oligarchic capitalists, who “parasited” 
the Soviet inheritance for their own personal gain.50  Society should be benevolent to those 
in need, and “one person should not be indifferent to other people,” The “support of other 
citizens is the norm in relations between people.”  Moreover, this support should come 
freely from citizens.  It should not be coerced, but should be the natural extension and 
result of the society Nashi hopes to construct.  Nashi sums up its troika of values as 
freedom -- both personal and the freedom of the nation-state from outside influence; the 
fairness of society; and solidarity among the people.51
    Nashi espouses other values as well.  When discussing Russia’s geo-political situation, 
the organization retreats to the fortress-like imagery of being surrounded by aggressive 
foreign powers who seek to steal the Russia’s inherent wealth.  While the group is 
cognizant of the dangers of this central location vis-à-vis the rest of the world, they also see 
an advantage: Russia is a nexus where all religions and peoples of the world live amongst 
50
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one another.  “Eastern and Western Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism all come 
together in Russia,” Nashi notes.  This cultural diversity is a pillar of strength and a 
characteristic that makes Russia a great nation.  The group bemoans the “clash of 
civilizations” it accuses ultra-nationalists in Russia of fomenting.52  Such a clash, which has 
already “killed” the Soviet Union, not only works against the inherent strength of cultural 
diversity, Nashi argues, but it also threatens Russia’s territorial integrity, a key component 
of sovereignty.53  In order for Russia to be strong, society must embrace all people of the 
Russian Federation.54
    How does Nashi propose to instill these principles and achieve a free and fair society that 
values solidarity and respects cultural diversity?  How does Nashi hope to defend Putin’s 
modernization program from the “unnatural union” of internal and external enemies that 
either by ignorance or design hope to forestall Russia’s progression from the chaos of the 
immediate post-Soviet years to the society it envisions?  How does Nashi intend to rise to 
the occasion and take historical responsibility like its members’ grandfathers did sixty 
years ago?  The organization offers a three-step program to this end.  The first task is to 
preserve “the sovereignty and unity of Russia.”  The second is to implement “the 
modernization of the country.”  The third is to form “an active civil society.”55
52
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    The first task sees Nashi acting as a stopgap against the further fragmentation of Russian 
society by uniting the youth of Russia under the auspices of a “socio-patriotic movement.”  
Both ultra-nationalists and outside powers hope to see the divisions sown among the 
Russian Federation’s many ethnicities lead to its break up, much as the Soviet Union split 
into its constituent parts.  Nashi is able to help unite the nation by spreading its ideology 
among youth and uniting them under a common banner.  “We must wake up the interest of 
our peers towards public life and politics,” and “make our values attractive to youth.”  “We 
must stand against fascism in all its forms, spread the ideas of unity of races, religions and 
cultures for the good of our common motherland.”  In order to do this, Nashi proposes to 
“go to every institute of higher learning, technical institute, poly-technical university and 
school” with their message and “be examples” by spreading “among our contemporaries 
the feeling of historical responsibility for the fate of our country.”  If successful, Nashi 
argues, not only will it have stemmed the tide of ethno-societal divisions and thwarted the 
attempts of Russia’s enemies to dissolve the Russian Federation, but also it also will have 
recruited “one million” young people to the Putin Revolution who will act as a base of 
support for his modernization programs.
    If the first proposed step is one that has a defensive component to it, Nashi then states 
the positive steps it wishes to take that, having prevented the breakdown of unity among 
the peoples of Russia, will ensure the modernization it proposes and sees Putin as 
providing.  As I wrote above, Nashi talks about a “revolution in content but not in form.”  It 
does not propose overthrowing the existing government.  It instead wishes to take it over 
by changing the makeup of the bureaucracy, and what it calls “the economic and 
administrative elite of the country.”  This elite in 2005, Nashi claims, is composed of 
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“defeatists” who failed in the test of historical responsibility and whose actions, or 
inactions, endanger the sovereignty of the Russian Federation while handing its resources 
over to oligarchs.  The Nashi Generation of leaders -- placed in positions of this elite by 
means of the electoral process, job-placement programs, youth initiatives and social 
mobilization -- will be different from this current generation in ideology and outlook.  
Gone will be the unmotivated and corruptible actors in the political, economic and social 
organs of the nation.  In their place will be Nashi-trained idealists.  
    What is the Nashi Generation?  What qualities do its members possess, and by extension, 
what qualities does the organization suppose the current generation of elite lacks?  In order 
to “change the format of political thought” the next generation of leaders must
1) Be Patriotic
2) Possess “Historical Optimism”
3) Possess “Strategic Thought”
4) Be Socially Responsible
5) Be Open to “the New”
6) Be Constructive
    Finally, members of the Nashi Generation must be able to “rally like-minded people 
around the tasks of modernization and direct the energy of the team towards the resolution 
of these tasks” while being professional “in their sphere of action,” whether that sphere is 
in government, the business world, or an educational setting.  Nashi proposes that 
participation in its organization, as well as its “‘supermodern’ educational programs” will 
mold young individuals into the next generation of Russia’s leaders.
    The first two tasks Nashi proposes to carry out are primarily focused on its own 
organization: the propagation of its ideals and recruitment of members, and then, having 
accomplished this, deployment of those individuals into the spheres in which Nashi 
perceives the battles for modernization to be fought.  The third and final task, with which 
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the organization closes its manifesto, announces Nashi’s goal to form “an active civil 
society.”  The modernization initiatives it hopes to realize will not succeed without the 
support “from below.”  This is a theme that echoes an earlier pronouncement about the 
importance of society acting justly and fairly on its own accord, and not as the result of 
“coercion” from the state.  It further defines the Nashi Revolution as one that engages all 
levels of society, a revolution in the social as well as in the political sphere.  Nashi believes 
that its platform will be unsuccessful if it lacks public support.  Indeed, it may even prove 
to be impossible.  As a result, Nashi cannot simply focus on its own members and their 
actions within the economic and political elite.  It must work to influence society as well.   
    The notion of civil society is a complicated matter, and an in-depth discussion of its 
formation and activity in contemporary Russia is outside the scope of this thesis.  Even 
Nashi does not explicitly spell out what it means by the term “active civil society.” Its 
discussion mentions few of the traditional hallmarks of civil society, such as the activity of 
non-governmental organizations or other groups.  Nashi’s definition of “active civil 
society” seems to revolve around its own activities, and its interaction with individuals 
outside the organization, via “discussion clubs in institutes of higher learning,” “civil 
debates,” “mass actions,” or “everyday work with the organs of state power and public 
organizations.”  Nashi defines an “active civil society” mostly by saying what it is not; 
Russia lacks an active civil society and Russia also suffers from “despondency, 
dependency, apathy and the inability to self-organize.”  Therefore, the opposite condition, 
which Nashi intends to initiate, is what it perceives to be an active civil society.  Mostly, 
Nashi views civil society as another tool in its arsenal with which to battle its enemies.  
Having aided in the formation of an active civil society, Nashi will be confident knowing 
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that when it makes “specific demands about the removal of specific bureaucrats from 
power,” Nashi will have “thousands of young people” standing with it.  “Every oligarch or 
bribe-taker, street punk or member of a totalitarian organization” will be aware that Nashi 
is ready to “clash” with them.  Forming civil society then is more about propagating its 
own messages to a broader population.  
    Taken together, Nashi’s manifesto stresses a variety of sometimes competing and 
contradictory norms, among them the importance of Russian national sovereignty; social 
justice; equal justice; modernization; stability; personal freedom; cultural diversity; 
patriotism; and “an active civil society.”  Nashi closely links these values and ideals to 
those Vladimir Putin supposedly espouses as well, and implicitly or explicitly declares that 
its opponents, whether “fascists,” “liberals,” or “Westernizers,” are antithetical to these 
principles.  
    This is Nashi’s program.  This is “Our Truth.”  In this section there are other documents 
detailing Nashi’s goals and ideology, ranging from the practical (statements by its national 
commissars) to more abstract approaches (Boris Yakemenko’s florid “The Path for 
Russia”) but all repeat the same points stressed in the manifesto.  Taken together, these 
documents and publications represent the ideological blueprint for Nashi’s activities and 
events as the organization seeks to advance its claims and mobilize Russian youths towards 
the attainment of its goals.  From “Our Truth,” I wish to now turn to “Our Deeds,” (NASHE 
Delo), and examine how Nashi acts according to this ideology and identity.
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B. Activities and Events: Transforming NASHA Pravda into NASHE Delo
    In my discussion of Nashi’s activities, both national and local, I seek to demonstrate how 
Nashi translates its manifesto into action.  Each event that I will describe has its roots in the 
language of the manifesto.  Furthermore, I will argue each serves a mobilizing function 
according to scholarship on collective action, from the identity formation of the Victory 
Day celebrations to the ritualization activities employed by local, citywide chapters.  For 
the analysis of local chapter activity, I use anecdotes from Nashi’s Vladimir chapter.  This 
organization is typical of the regional activity of Nashi, and as representative as any.  
    It is no accident that Nashi’s first large-scale event was the Our Victory celebration on 5 
May 2005, during which commissars from all over the country convened on Leninskii 
Prospekt in Moscow to meet with veterans of the Great Patriotic War.  Between fifty and 
sixty thousand youths gathered for the event that ranged in tone from somber remembrance 
to red meat rally, replete with cries to continue the fight for “the independence of our 
Motherland!”56  Nashi claimed that the event drew participants from more than thirty 
regions of Russia.  The youths, clad in white t-shirts bearing red stars on which was written 
“Our Victory” and waving the red and white Nashi flag, listened to speeches by several of 
Nashi’s national commissars, Yakemenko included, and met with World War II veterans, 
several thousand of whom joined the youths in their march down Leninskii Prospekt.  In a 
particularly symbolic event, the veterans presented the young participants of the action with 
medals in the shape of a 1940s-vintage shell casing on which was engraved “Remember the 
War, Protect the Motherland!”57
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    This act was one of several meant to indicate the passing of the torch from one 
generation to the next, and to symbolize the Nashi Generation’s resolve to take the 
“historical responsibility” the group defines in its manifesto, just as their grandfathers did 
during the Great Patriotic War.  The martial music blaring from louder speakers, the Nashi 
flags that resembled Tsarist-era naval banners, and speeches whose language was heavy 
with references to battle and struggle all recalled past eras of glory, and reminded the 
participants that such glory and prestige was earned through struggle, a struggle that is still 
salient in contemporary Russia.  “We will have to defend this independence [won by the 
veterans during the Great Patriotic War],” Yakemenko told NTV television during the 
event, “in business and the economy, in the factories and (university) lecture halls.”58
Nashi used this rally not to call its members to armed battle against its opponents, but to 
conflate the struggles against yesterday’s fascists on the battlefield with the contemporary 
fight against the modern fascists Nashi details in its manifesto.  “We will make Russia a 
strong and great country again!” the group writes in its account of the day’s events.  This 
struggle, a descendent of the struggle against fascism, is assured by the Nashi Generation’s 
decision to take historical responsibility.  “While hundreds of thousands of our kids 
remember the war and protect the motherland…Russia will be a great, free, and 
independent country!”59
    The Victory Day Rally capped off a busy week for Nashi, during which the group 
opened a museum about the Great Patriotic War in Grozny and organized artillery salutes 
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to veterans in Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn.60  Nashi also claimed that its members spent the 
weeks preceding the Victory Day observation erecting more than 1800 memorials to 
“heroes” of the war across the country.61
    While remembrance of the war is certainly widespread in Russia, it would be incorrect to 
simply view these activities as the organization taking part in an occasion observed 
throughout the country.  Coming so soon after the establishment of the movement, and 
being the first time the organization received widespread coverage in the press, the Our 
Victory events planned and carried out by Nashi are a key component of the identity 
formation the group employs for mobilization purposes.  As McAdam et al. write, identity 
formation as a mobilizing structure often builds upon existing identities.62  The desire of 
Nashi to build upon the traditional reverence afforded by Russians of all social and political 
strata represents a push to equate in the minds of the populace, as well as its own members, 
the goals of Nashi with the struggle of a symbolically strong event.  
    Certainly, this is nothing new.  The official veneration of the World War II generation 
became ingrained in Russian life in the decades following the war.63  In the decade 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, reverence for the veteran generation and the 
victory over fascism became arguably more entrenched, changing from a source of pride 
that the Soviet regime transformed into shared collective consciousness, to, as Gudkov 
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writes, “the only positive anchor point for post-Soviet society’s national consciousness.”64
Nashi’s goal is to play to the emotions traditionally associated with the war, and convince 
its constituents and adherents -- as well as the bystander public -- that it is in the same 
tradition, thus forming its own identity based on an existing one.
    If Nashi’s first major event sought to establish the identity of the organization as one that 
seizes the baton of historical responsibility from the generation of their grandparents, the 
Seliger-2005 camp, which Nashi conducted for two weeks in July 2005, was concerned 
with their own self-organization, and their stated goal of effectively forming a youth 
movement to spread their “ideological influence” among Russia’s youth.65  As Nashi states 
in its manifesto, in order to effectively organize the defense of Russia from its enemies, and 
be in a position to support Putin’s modernization policies, a youth vanguard is required.  
The camp at Lake Seliger was intended to train the most dedicated of this vanguard, the 
regional commissars,66 in political action, as well engage them in discussion and debate 
about how best to carry out Nashi’s programs.67
    The camp was at times militaristic, with commissars gathering at 8 a.m. for a five-
kilometer run, and at times reminiscent of an ordinary summer camp, with ping-pong 
matches and boating on the lake, as well as the requisite discussions of “beer and girls.”68
Two commissars constantly stood guard beside an eternal flame in honor of fallen veterans 
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of the Great Patriotic War.69  A group of volunteers left the camp temporarily to help 
restore the nearby Nilova Pustin monastery as a sign of gratitude to the Orthodox Church 
for the use of some of the land on which Nashi conducted the camp.70  The days were 
capped off with concerts by popular Russian rock bands.
    This at times incongruous mix of the whimsical and solemn dissipated as the camp 
progressed, the tone becoming more serious.  Nashi claimed that during the course of the 
camp, the 3,000 participants attended more than 870 hours of lectures and 400 separate 
classes, seminars and workshops.71  Yakemenko characterized the camp as an educational 
project, designed to train Nashi’s members for their future roles in the elite of the country, 
the first step of the “change of format” the organization describes in its manifesto.72
“Comrades, this is about the future.  We need new methods, new ideas.”73  Teams of 
commissars from different regions met for discussions that ranged from the philosophical 
(“USA – Ally or Enemy?”) to the practical (“Should the Nashi movement become a 
political party?”).74  Commissars attended workshops on public speaking, and one titled 
“The Psychology of the Organization of a Propagandistic Campaign.”  
    There were also speakers.  Gleb Pavlovskii, a Kremlin insider who serves as advisor to 
Putin’s chief of staff Dmitrii Medvedev, spoke to the assembled group and warned them of 
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the possibility of an event similar to Ukraine’s Orange Revolution occurring in Russia, and 
suggested it was up to Nashi to prevent it.75  “We need to prepare a politically literate 
generation,” to prevent such mischief, Pavlovsky opined.  “Your job is to defend the 
constitutional order if and when the coup comes.”76  Vladislav Surkov strolled around the 
grounds with Yakemenko, dropping into the various workshops for question and answer 
sessions with the excited youths.  The effects on the youth gathered seemed positive.  “I’ve 
seen people transform in front of my eyes,” said one 19-year old participant.77
    Perhaps the only thing that marred the event was when three members of the liberal 
organization Youth Yabloko infiltrated the camp.  They managed to stay for three days 
before being detected.  Yabloko claims they were forcibly expelled; Yakemenko denies 
this.78  “Let them come for a week and debate with us…Politics is all about the free 
exchange of ideas.”79
    The purpose of this “educational project” and the “free exchange of ideas” at the Seliger 
camp was to mobilize the most committed members of the organization and provide them 
with the tools to carry out Nashi’s activities in cities throughout Russia.  Among Nashi’s 
75
 Evans, Times Online, 18 July 2005.
76
 Boykewich, 18 July 2005; Evans, Times Online, 18 July 2005.
77
 Boykewich, 18 July 2005.
78
 Barabanov, Il’ia, “Kak ‘Nashi’ provodiat leto,” Gazeta.ru, 13 July 2005.  This was not the first time Youth 
Yabloko tried to covertly attend a Nashi function.  Il’ia Yashin, the organization’s leader, snuck into Nashi’s 
organizational meeting (dubbed “Russia’s New Intellectual Elite”) on 28 February 2005.  Upon being 
recognized, Yashin claims a member of Nashi denounced him as an “enemy” and proclaimed to the gathered 
audience, “These are the people you will fight.”  Yakemenko denies that Nashi forcibly expelled Yashin, but 
did concede that he was dropped into a snow drift.  Quoted in The Standard, 8 March 2005, 
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/Focus/GC08Dh02.html. Additionally, a member of the National 
Bolsheviks covertly attended Nashi’s first meeting of regional delegates on 15 April 2005.  Faking an illness, 
the activist, Ol’ga Shalina, ascended to the stage and threw a bottle of water and a microphone into the 
surprised audience before being removed by security.  “Znai Nashikh!” 
http://www.nashi.su/pravda/84397501.
79
 Quoted in Boykewich, 18 July 2005.
40
goals is to act as examples for Russian youths to follow, and to organize a socio-patriotic 
movement to unite young Russians around the banner of Putin’s modernization campaign.  
Nashi’s organizers hoped that the 3,000 attendees from forty-five cities throughout Russia 
would take the lessons learned from the workshops and speakers back to their hometowns 
and put them into practice in Nashi’s local organizations.  
    It is to these local organizations that I will now turn my attention.  While the purpose of 
Our Victory and rallies like it are in part to galvanize recruits in mass organizations, as well 
as attempt to foster a positive perception of Nashi among the populace, much of a young 
person’s initial contact with Nashi is through the local organizations.  Nashi has chapters in 
twenty-three cities and towns throughout Russia.  Before I examine the activities which 
Nashi carries out on a local level, I would like to briefly describe Nashi’s organizational 
structure.  
    On 15 April 2005, nearly 700 youths from thirty regions of Russia gathered in Moscow 
for Nashi’s first conference of delegates.  Though Yakemenko announced Nashi’s 
formation in early March 2005, this gathering in April represents the true beginning of the 
organization from an operational standpoint.  The most pressing task of this meeting, which 
lasted for nearly ten hours, was the election of Nashi’s federal commissars (federal’nie 
komissary).  The organization elected five federal commissars for terms of eighteen 
months: Yakemenko, Natal’ia Lebedeva and Aleksandr Gorodetskii, both from Moscow, 
Mikhail Kulikov of St Petersburg, and Sergei Kuz’menko of Nizhnii Novgorod.  
Yakemenko polled the most votes among them, and thus is recognized as the first among 
equals of the five federal commissars.  The federal commissars are tasked with organizing 
the national activities of the organization, as well as acting as the movement’s public faces.  
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In addition to this national leadership cabal, there are the regional commissars (regional’nie 
komissary).  It was the regional commissars who participated in the Seliger-2005 camp.  
The regional commissars are the most committed participants in the organization who run 
the local chapters.  It is the responsibility of these regional commissars to adapt the 
ideology and activities of the national level to more local concerns.  Additionally, the 
regional commissars played a role in mobilizing participants for the Our Victory mass 
action.  Below the regional commissars in the hierarchy are the local level activists 
(storonniki).  These are youths age sixteen and older who “share the ideals and tasks of the 
movement, and who participate in the program for activists ‘Know Nashi,’” which Nashi 
uses to offer membership in the movement.80  This program is rather simple, and consists 
primarily of a short questionnaire.  Upon submission of the required information, an 
interested youth attends a meeting of the local chapter at which they are requested to 
propose ways to improve the organization, as well as describe how they see themselves 
within the broader activities at the local and national level.  While the bar for admission 
into the organization is rather low, the completion of the questionnaire and attendance at 
local meetings allows the activist to participate in the full range of educational and social 
activities carried out at the local level.  It is to these local events that I will now turn.
    The local chapters of Nashi have several important purposes.  First, within the 
ideological framework of the organization at a national level, the activity of the local 
branches serves to orient society towards what Nashi sees as “just society,” where “the fate 
of one person is not indifferent to other people, where help and support of other citizens is 
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the norm in relations between people.”81  Additionally, the local organizations seek to 
advance Nashi’s goal of creating an active civil society to further the modernization of the 
country, a component of which is a “social solidarity” that will cure a Russian society “sick 
from despondency, dependency, apathy and the inability to self-organize.”82  The local 
chapters seek to do this by organizing activities reminiscent of Soviet subbotniki, or days of 
volunteer labor, when citizens gathered to work on projects that ostensibly serve the public 
good.  The Nashi equivalent sends volunteers to care for orphans, to organize blood drives 
and to complete similar projects.  Moreover, local chapters are able to better organize these 
actions of public improvement because they are acting within the communities they know.  
As one regional commissar put it, local chapters are able to see the “sick places” within a 
community, and point the appropriate channels towards the resolution of such problem 
areas.  “I, for example,” he said, “ride the trolleybuses, and know that half of them are 
unheated.”  Members of Nashi’s regional chapters “understand municipal problems,” and 
can point Nashi’s resources towards these areas of deficiency.83
    The local chapters also conduct activities to advance Nashi’s goal of training the next 
generation of Russia’s leaders to replace the current generation of “defeatists.”  If Seliger-
2005 sought to train the most committed regional commissars, it is the lectures and 
symposiums held locally that hope to propagate those lessons to the future “elite” of the 
next generation.  These “master classes” resemble those given to Regional Commissars at 
Seliger in the summer of 2005.  Common themes include acquisition of knowledge about 
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Russian history and theories on the formation of public opinion, as well as the requisite 
courses on “anti-fascism.”
    Not every event is so serious.  Much like the Seliger camp had a social component to it, 
so do the activities of the local chapters.  In November 2005, the Vladimir chapter of Nashi 
organized a bike trip through the woods outside the city.  Two commissars, both veterans 
of the Seliger-2005 camp, led more than ten storonniki on the trip, all the while telling 
stories and anecdotes about their experiences at Seliger-2005 and demonstrating the 
camping skills they acquired.  On an even lighter note, the same chapter held a video game 
competition at a local computer club, during which fifty participants raced against each 
other in pixilated hot-rods on computers screens.  Billed as an alternative to “drinking 
beer,” the competition attracted around 100 spectators in addition to the participants. 
    From a theoretical point of view, the local activities -- from the educational symposiums 
to the subbotniki to social and sporting events local chapters hold -- seek to ritualize the 
movement and establish a base of support that can be mobilized into mass actions when 
needed, such as the Our Victory rally or another event in the future Participants in a 
collective action, once identifying with that action and becoming embedded within that 
movement via identity formation and social interactions, are therefore able to be mobilized 
into mass collective action for the furtherance of the goals of the organization.84
Participants in an organization, upon adoption of the identity of the organization, “undergo 
modifications of their boundaries and attributes as they interact” that move them to act 
“within broadly defined scripts and organizational constraints.”85  A Russian youth, having 
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adopted the ideological identity of Nashi via the movement’s propaganda and as a result of 
participation in the ritualizing events that the local chapters conduct, can thus be mobilized 
through the broader mechanisms of the movement, or transformed from low-risk, unskilled 
participation and attendance to a greater commitment to the actions and events of the 
organization.  Nashi’s storonniki are grounded “in ties created by previous contention 
and/or routine social life” of the organization.86  In most cases, an activist’s interaction with 
the organization is via the local chapter.  Being embedded within that hierarchical structure, 
however, places them within the mobilizing mechanism of the entire movement, and as a 
result, local participants are tied to collective actions at the national level.  Nashi gains 
strength by organizing locally and creating relationships, between the storonniki and the 
regional commissars, as well as in a structural sense between the center and the periphery 
of the organization.  It is via these processes that local organizations provide much of the 
organization’s strength.  
I have attempted in this chapter to link Nashi’s ideological pronouncements with the 
formation among its adherents of a mobilizing identity and to demonstrate the way this 
identity, along with its activities and events, allows Nashi to mobilize within the field of 
opportunities and constraints.  Further, I have shown that different activities employed by 
Nashi are meant to provide different results, from solidifying the ideological rhetoric, 
creating a sense of collective identity, and fusing the peripheral and national initiatives into 
a broad plan of action.  I wish now to turn to Nashi’s relationships with other actors within 
the socio-political field and sketch the field in which Nashi orients itself in the hopes of 
lending context to the activities and events that Nashi perpetrates.
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Chapter 2: Nashi and the Socio-Political Field: Actors and Opportunities
While my analysis in chapter one focused on Nashi’s activities, ideology and identity, 
the next two chapters of this thesis are concerned with the organization’s relationships with 
other actors in the socio-political field, and the effects such relationships have on Nashi’s 
ability to mobilize and the character of that mobilization.  I hope to show in the remaining 
chapters of this thesis how a social movement organization interacts with other actors in the 
socio-political field, and how this interaction guides and inhibits an organization’s actions 
and mobilization.  The activity of a social movement organization in the “field of 
opportunities and constraints” is a sum of the organization’s goals, its means and resources, 
and its environment.87  A social movement organization such as Nashi in this “multi-action 
system” is, in part, dependent on the availability of resources and the relative favorability 
of the environment in which it resides.88  The efficacy of the organization is dependent on 
its satisfaction of these “multiple and contrasting requirements,” meaning resources and 
opportunity.89  At the same time, an organization can make up for a deficit of a given 
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requirement with a surplus in another.90  The effectiveness of a social movement 
organization is never accidental, and it is never assumed.  A social movement organization 
achieves whatever unity it has, and participates in actions it chooses not by chance, but due 
to the ability of the organization to orient itself within this multi-polar action field, and 
exploit the opportunities afforded to it by that field by means of its goals, resources and 
environment.  At the same time, the organization must minimize its liabilities within that 
same field.  A social movement organization needs this “social construction,” and 
continually negotiates within these dimensions to enable mobilization.91
    I will demonstrate in this chapter how this field guides, informs and alters Nashi’s 
actions and ideology.  I will also argue in this chapter that Nashi’s relationship with the 
state, itself one of the mitigating actors within this field, provides it with access to 
resources which support mobilization.  The fact that its goals intersect to some degree with 
those of the state also aids Nashi’s mobilization.  In my examination of this relationship, I 
also provide an analysis of the state’s motives in supporting and enabling Nashi.  To begin, 
I will examine how errors in negotiating this multi-polar field can negatively affect a social 
movement organization and analyze how Nashi steers though this environment, in contrast 
to its predecessor, Moving Together.
A.  Moving Together to Nashi: the transformation of a social movement organization based 
on the effects of the wider socio-political field
    If Moving Together suffered from a lack of a coherent ideology, the organization’s fall 
from grace was also due to other factors as well.  As I noted above, the antics the 
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organization perpetrated to “cleanse” Russian culture of “pornographic” influences by 
destroying the books of Sorokin and Viktor Pelevin managed to alienate fervent high-
profile supporters such as Vladislav Surkov.  If such activities caused alarm among 
sympathetic actors within the Putin regime, it is reasonable to deduce that they also 
reflected poorly upon the organization in the eyes of its constituents and the bystander 
public, thus weakening the ability of the organization to mobilize.
    Several additional factors worked to the detriment of Moving Together, all of which had 
to do with the organization’s relationships to other actors in the socio-political field, and/or 
the environment in which it resided in late 2004 and early 2005.  The first is the 
prominence achieved by Moving Together’s “opponents” -- opposition youth organizations 
-- that competed for the same constituents as Moving Together.  Seeking to take advantage 
of the negative effects created by Moving Together’s notoriety, opposition youth 
movements sought to recruit Moving Together’s constituents into their own ranks.  
Organizations such as the National Bolsheviks and Youth Yabloko were particularly active 
in 2004. 
    The National Bolshevik Party, the brainchild of radical writer Eduard Limonov, has been 
active in Russian since 1994, though its ideological roots go back further than that.  The 
organization claims upwards of 30,000 members, and despite official condemnation and the 
brief jailing of Limonov, the organization remains operational.  It specializes in rather 
outrageous displays of anti-politics, among them throwing mayonnaise on prominent public 
officials, an act the organization calls “velvet terror.”  In 2004 and 2005, the organization
increasingly allied itself with Youth Yabloko in opposition to the Putin Administration, 
which considers the National Bolsheviks a terrorist organization.  Youth Yabloko, headed 
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by Il’ia Yashin, is the youth wing of the liberal Yabloko Party.  Youth Yabloko seeks to 
mobilize youths to achieve the group’s “Five Priorities of Our Generation,” among them 
reforming education, labor, and the army, protecting the environment and creating civil 
society.92
    New groups sprung up as well; some, such as Skazhi Net!93 worked to publicize anti-
Putin activities and demonstrations throughout Russia; others, such as Idushchie bez Putina 
sought to organize youths dedicated to a liberal platform of ideals, similar to Youth 
Yabloko.  These groups, most obviously Idushchie bez Putina, or “Moving without Putin,” 
positioned themselves as alternatives to Moving Together, whose name they were 
obviously punning.  Moving Together faced a recruiting roadblock: a combination of 
competition for constituents and bad press.94  Its abilities to negotiate within the field of 
opportunities and constraints diminished to the point that its weakened ideology was not 
enough to ensure mobilization.
    Other factors within the multi-polar action system contributed to Moving Together’s loss 
of initiative, and these factors point to the importance that the socio-political environment 
can play in a social movement organization’s development.  The success of Viktor 
Yushchenko in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution highlighted the impact that mass-actions can
make in political situations.  Many of those who gathered to protest the election returns 
showing a victory for Viktor Yanukovych were members of the youth organization Pora!95
As in Georgia in 2003 and Serbia in 2000, youth organizations seemed to galvanize the 
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population towards regime change.  Closer to home, the rallies against Putin’s altering of 
the country’s pension scheme in January 2005, in which Youth Yabloko were conspicuous 
participants, represented a direct challenge to the regime.  If the major domestic crises 
faced by the Putin regime since he took office were the Kursk disaster and the Beslan 
hostage standoff, this was the first that directly related to one of his own policies.  Putin’s 
popularity, while strong, was threatened.96
    It was soon after these dual events that Moving Together announced the formation of 
Nashi.  With its heavy emphasis on patriotic instead of cultural issues, Nashi sought to 
transform the faltering mobilization capabilities of Moving Together into a more 
disciplined, structured and “radical” youth organization capable of preventing “the 
development of an event along the Ukrainian and Georgian scenario” in Russia.97  It is 
reasonable to judge that the leaders of Moving Together, many of whom moved with 
Yakemenko to Nashi, judged that that organization was incapable of organizing opposition 
to these anti-Putin youth organizations, especially in a crisis situation, such as occurred in 
Ukraine or Georgia.  Due to a combination of ideological deficiencies, potential alienation 
of patrons, constituents and the bystander public due to the lack of saliency of its platform, 
and the changing socio-political environment, Moving Together ceased to be the 
mobilization force that it was in 2002.  “‘Moving [Together]’ is not capable of fulfilling the 
task of renewing the country,” Yakemenko concluded in March 2005.98  Faced with the 
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organization’s inability to achieve its goals effectively, he changed his focus to a new 
organization that he reasoned was better equipped to navigate the multi-polar field of 
opportunities and constraints.99
B.  Nashi's Leadership and its Effect on Mobilization
    The suddenness of Nashi’s emergence with a ready-made ideology and its ability to 
stage massive rallies like the Our Victory event and the Seliger-2005 camp indicates that 
the organization had well-developed sources of financing and networking capabilities, in 
addition to other resources crucial to mobilization.  One of the resources the organization 
had at its disposal is the cadre of leadership transferred from Moving Together, 
Yakemenko in particular.  Leadership cadres of new organizations tend to come from the 
fragmentation of prior organizations.100  So too did a portion of Nashi’s leadership, who 
came from Moving Together.  Though Moving Together did not fragment per se, Nashi 
certainly did not emerge out of nowhere, and the ability of its leaders to seize on “major 
interest cleavages and [redefine] long-standing grievances in new terms” points to the 
importance that the leadership cadre has to the organization.101 By adopting some of 
Moving Together’s tactics, while discarding some of the more controversial activities that 
99
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organization perpetrated, Nashi’s leadership cadre was able to utilize some of the “major 
cleavages” of Moving Together’s program – reorienting Russian society away from outside 
influences and stressing Russia’s centrality in its own fate – while discarding the elements 
of its program which alienated the bystander public and constituents, or narrowed its focus 
to the fate of a single president.  Whereas Moving Together sought to save Russia via a 
cultural program, Nashi focus was on patriotism, anti-fascism, education and social service.  
The result was “teams of adolescents in t-shirts reading ‘Everything is on track!’ running 
en masse to Nashi.”102
    The catalyst for much of this exodus was Yakemenko himself.  Yakemenko is the 
uncontested leader of Nashi.  Though technically he is only one of five federal commissars, 
it is hard to imagine a scenario in which he would not be in a leadership position in the 
organization.  If a leadership cadre is a fruitful resource for a social movement 
organization’s ability to carry out its program, it is prudent to examine the motives of that 
leadership.  While it may be impossible to deduce his motives entirely, Yakemenko’s 
activities with Moving Together, his subsequent employment at the Kremlin, and his 
eventual involvement in forming Nashi indicate a transformation from a simple activist to a 
professional movement organizer, to the benefit of the organization and himself.  
Yakemenko insists he began Moving Together with his brother Boris simply because they 
were impressed by Putin, and that they decided to form a youth organization supportive of 
his presidency strictly because of that admiration.  However, it was this early movement 
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organization activity that led to Yakemenko’s “discovery,” and to a short stint at the 
Kremlin working in the Department of External Relations.
    It is reasonable to suggest that his experience with Moving Together allowed him to 
initiate contacts that furthered his political and social goals, and quite possibly benefited 
him financially.103  Regardless of this potential motive, his public statements suggest that 
he sees Nashi as a necessary organization for youths struggling to find their place in 
contemporary Russian society.  In youth organizations, young people “simply find the 
answer to the question ‘What is there that I can do?’”  Faced with many choices, from 
Molodaia Gvardiia, the new youth wing of the United Russia Party, to the National 
Bolsheviks, Yakemenko believes youths will choose that organization which best satisfies 
their needs.  In this marketplace of youth social and political organizations, there must be a 
choice that offers a chance “to become a first-class administrator,” which is what 
Yakemenko contends Nashi provides.104
    To be sure, Yakemenko is not solely interested in satisfying such a need.  He is 
contemptuous of non-Nashi youth organizations, and his rhetoric decrying the Orange 
Revolution indicates that he certainly sees Nashi as a guarantor against such a situation 
occurring in Russia.  He believes youth are an “effective instrument” that politicians will 
use to achieve their political ends.  Yakemenko, due to his experience with Moving
Together, considers himself in a position to guide youth down what he believes is the 
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proper path, for their good, and for the good of Russia.  “The politicization of youth doesn’t 
just happen,” he told Strana.ru in November 2005.  Yakemenko hopes to intercept youths 
before they are swept up by supposedly improper political or social ideals.105
    As far as the mobilization of Nashi is concerned, Yakemenko has value as the head of 
the leadership cadre of federal commissars.  In this role, Yakemenko is able to not only 
bring “organizing facilities”106 to the nascent movement organization, but his ability to 
exploit institutional contacts and resources also is a distinct advantage for Nashi.107   As 
Jenkins writes, “forging alliances with polity members” “creates a qualitative increment in 
the returns” for a social movement organization, and “shelters the movement against 
repression.”108
C.  Nashi and the State: A Confluence of Interest
    Yakemenko’s role as leader of the organization, and the experiences and skills he brings 
to the leadership cadre are invaluable to Nashi in its efforts to mobilize youths and work 
towards its stated goals, and to provide them with an organization that guides them down 
the proper political path.  However, it is in Yakemenko’s relationship to the Putin regime, 
the organization’s entrée into the polity, that his real value emerges.  I would like now to 
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examine Nashi’s relationship with the state, and examine the state’s potential motives for 
embracing a movement organization such as Nashi.
    Discussing Nashi’s relationship to the state using the frameworks provided by 
contemporary movement scholarship is potentially problematic due to their tendency to 
focus on social movement organizations that are oppositional to the state.  In the 
oppositional paradigm, a state’s relationship with a social movement organization is 
combination of cooption and mitigation: states employ “tolerant tactics” to negotiate with 
movement leadership when possible, and options that are more repressive when mass-
action demonstrations potentially damage the state’s interests.  The relationship between 
states and social movement organizations then becomes, from the state’s perspective, an 
exercise in damage control, with states seeking to bargain with opposition leaders when 
possible, and to crackdown on mass-actions with varying degrees of repression when 
not.109
    This duality represents one potential relationship.  However, another is more apt when 
examining Nashi’s relationship to the state.  A state can lend support to a social movement 
or a social movement organization when their goals intersect, as they do in the case of 
Nashi and the regime of Vladimir Putin.  Even if it is nothing more than moral support, a 
state’s embrace of a social movement organization’s goals can reap dividends for both the 
state, by encouraging supporters of the regime who share a similar goal, and the 
109
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organization, by providing morale to spur organizational and mobilizing efforts.110  The 
state then acts as a resource that aids the social movement organization.  In this model, 
Nashi and sympathetic actors within the government represent what Tilly calls “polity,” 
which is a term used to describe the intersection and interactive relationship between an 
organization and the state, and coordination of action, even if loose, by these actors.111
Nashi in this model acts as a “member of polity,” or “a contender which has routine, low-
cost access to resources controlled by the government,” with which the government and the 
organization as a coalition coordinate their actions to achieve common ends.112  Such a 
coalition is advantageous to a social movement organization, in that it allows for greater 
“returns from collective action,” and such “recognition pays off in collective access to jobs, 
exemptions from taxation, availability of privileged information, and so on.”113  Nashi’s 
relationship with the state allows access to both monetary and non-monetary resources, 
which aid its mobilization.  Nashi’s links to the state and the relationships between the two 
that result in this polity coalition thus become an important target of analysis.
    I would like to discuss briefly more concrete state-connected resources afforded to 
Nashi.  Since Nashi’s inception, press reports in Russia and abroad have speculated widely 
about the level of Kremlin involvement in Nashi’s organization and finances, and Nashi’s 
at times vague responses have done nothing but fuel this speculation.  For his part, 
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Yakemenko cites an unspecified “group of Russian companies” as the source of Nashi’s 
finances, and added that he is “certain that the fatherland’s large companies will support 
us.”114  Concerning the financing of events such as Our Victory and Seliger-2005, 
Yakemenko said, “We ask [such businesses] to support the creation of a new political and 
managerial elite for the country. If they refuse, it’s considered unpatriotic.”115  Patriotism 
aside, federal commissar Mikhail Kulikov offers that businesspersons and “employees in 
the educational sphere” are sympathetic to Nashi’s program and work to provide financing 
accordingly.116 Kulikov calls suggestions that Nashi’s manifesto is the product of Kremlin 
insiders “complete nonsense.”117
    Regardless of whether the Kremlin had a hand in Nashi’s finances and construction of 
ideology, it is clear that the Kremlin took an interest in the activities of Nashi in 2005, and 
in its potential as an organization.  It is in the involvement of Vladislav Surkov, Deputy 
Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and Aide to the President, with the 
organization that the relationship between Nashi and the state becomes clear.  Seen widely 
as a patron of Nashi, Surkov has been connected to Nashi since its inception, and prior to 
that worked with Moving Together.  Surkov’s involvement, however difficult it is to 
ascertain completely, and his working relationship with Yakemenko, represents the most 
direct link between Nashi and the state.
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        Surkov, 41, is a somewhat shadowy figure himself.  Although his official biography 
on the Kremlin’s website says he was born in the Lipetsk region, Russian newspapers 
reported in 2005 that in fact he was born near Groznii, the son of a Chechen father and a 
Russian mother, and that his birth name was Aslambek Dudaev.118  Surkov began a career 
in business as the Soviet Union fell apart, and rose to high positions in Rosprom and Alfa 
Bank in the mid-1990s.  In 1999, he entered politics in the Presidential Executive Office, 
eventually becoming Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and Aide 
to the President in early 2004.  It was in his governmental capacities that in 2001 he first 
met Yakemenko, then the upstart leader of Moving Together.119
    Surkov has many responsibilities at the Kremlin, but among the most important are his 
tasks concerning coordinating the president’s contacts within the government, as well as 
with political parties, public and religious organizations and trade unions, and his direction 
of Putin’s media contacts along with Aleksey Gromov, the presidential press attaché.  He 
has been instrumental in recent years asserting executive power in Russian governance and 
pushing through Putin’s economic reforms.
    In 2005, Surkov took the helm in creating an ideology associated with patriotism and a 
strong executive.  This push coincided with the events in Ukraine and the backlash against 
Putin’s altering of the pension scheme in January 2005, which represented a significant 
dent in the armor of Putin’s once unassailable public opinion ratings.  Surkov’s acceptance 
of the necessity of such an ideology was new to him.  In 2002, he seemed to indicate that 
he did not believe Russia needed a national idea to replace Soviet ideology.  When asked 
118
 There is no close relation between Surkov’s paternal family and former Chechen president Dzhokhar 
Dudaev.
119
 Corwin, “Russia: ‘A Youth…;” “The President of Russia,” http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/subj/22172.shtml
58
about a proposed plan to fill the empty square once occupied by a statue of Felix 
Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Cheka, the first manifestation of the Soviet secret police, 
outside the Lubianka, the headquarters of the KGB in Soviet times and today still occupied 
by the FSB, Surkov said the square should remain empty.  Deflecting suggestions from 
interest groups across the ideological spectrum about what should take the place of the 
statue toppled by anti-Soviet demonstrators in 1991, a debate that became somewhat of a 
cultural and ideological metaphor for post-Soviet Russian consciousness, Surkov demurred.  
“Let nothing be there,” he said.  “We can survive.”120
    That seems to have changed.  Surkov began to suggest in 2005 that he stands for the 
concept of “sovereign democracy,” a strong state that respects personal freedom.121
Moreover, he has decried the effectiveness of the bureaucracy, calling its members 
“archaic” and suggesting that new blood is needed to modernize the country and cast off 
the Soviet legacy.122  In October 2004, concurrent with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, 
he told Komsomol’skaia pravda that a “fifth column” of liberals working in concert with 
Western governments sought to undermine Russian state power.123  Surkov’s change in 
rhetoric and the similarities between it and Nashi’s manifesto are interesting to say the 
least.  Given the involvement of youth in both the anti-Yanukovych Orange Revolution and 
the pensioner rallies in Russia, it seems Surkov concluded that co-option was the best route 
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for the state to take in such matters.  As he told Business Week in 2002 in reference to 
Moving Together, “the government needs the support of the streets, too.”  This desire for 
the support of the streets, the role youth played in upheaval deemed dangerous by the Putin 
regime, and the recent interest of Russian youths towards politics adds up to a need for the 
Putin administration to offer an outlet for sympathetic youths to show their support.  “We 
almost lost the youth in the nineties,” he told Der Spiegel.  “[T]his is something we must 
address.”124
    Whether or not Surkov was directly involved in Nashi’s organizations and activities, it is 
clear he saw Nashi as part of the state’s addressing of youth political activity.  Nashi, 
however, was not the only avenue by which Surkov hoped to influence Russian youth.  As 
Nashi was officially announcing its formation, Surkov began work on another front, 
inviting members and representatives from seven popular Russian rock and roll bands, 
several of whom would later play concerts at Seliger-2005, to a discrete meeting at a hotel 
in Moscow in April 2005.  None of the parties involved seemed very interested in detailing 
the topics of discussion.  According to press reports, the role that popular rock acts played 
in entertaining the youths gathered in support of the Orange Revolution was discussed, 
with Surkov pleading with the musicians to decline to participate in a similar hypothetical 
event in Russia, and at “to remain neutral at least” in any such situation.125
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    This effort by Surkov to guide youth opinion coincided with a measure by the Russian 
government to support patriotic education around the country.  The “The State Program for 
the Patriotic Education of Citizens” allocated 497.8 million rubles ($17.5 million) to fund 
military-style training in schools; organize patriotic song writing contests; and encourage 
youths to participate in events memorializing military victories, all with the aim of making 
patriotism “the spiritual backbone” of the nation.126  Although the bill was designed to 
encourage patriotism at all age levels, youth were a particular focus.  A portion of the 
funding would go to the establishment of regional offices that organize events to encourage 
patriotism.127
    What this adds up to is an enthusiasm on the part of the state to encourage activities and 
organizations that have a patriotic component, and to co-opt those who might shape the 
opinions of youth.  It is more than just conjecture then to suggest that, given the timing of 
the events, the rhetoric of government representatives at the Seliger-2005 camp, and the 
activity of Surkov in Nashi’s activities, that the state saw an interest in harnessing youth 
opinion to buttress itself against a potential Orange Revolution-type situation.  In Nashi, it 
saw an organization sympathetic, by design or otherwise, to its aims and ideals, with the 
mobilizing capacity to turn out thousands of youths for mass-actions, youths who might 
otherwise rally to oppositional causes.  As Vladimir Frolov of the Fund for Effective 
Politics says, Nashi’s “job is to preempt…if push comes to shove, Nashi’s job will be to 
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occupy every public square in front of every public building of importance,” so that “CNN 
would have a nice picture with the Kremlin in the background.”128
    The Kremlin has less dramatic interests in the mobilization capacities of Nashi – witness 
the organization’s participation in the Moscow City Council elections in December 2005, 
when 3,400 commissars worked in polling places conducting exit polls.  Nashi’s 
participation, in which they worked under the auspices of United Russia and the Party of 
Social Justice, represented the organization’s first foray into electoral politics.  Nashi 
announced that the experience was a success, and that it allows the organization to build 
towards mobilizing 100,000 commissars to actively work in similar capacities “to ensure 
free and democratic elections” in the parliamentary elections of 2007, and the presidential 
election in 2008.129  The Kremlin undoubtedly would be interested in the active support of 
100,000 presumably sympathetic youths integrated into the electoral system.
    Apart from the resources the state gains from Nashi, the organization’s close proximity 
to the state reaps mobilizing fruit as well.  Leaving aside the alleged financial and 
infrastructural resources that the Kremlin may be making available to the organization, 
Nashi’s ability to identify closely to a popular president allows it to conflate support for the 
president with support for Nashi.  The photographs from the meeting between Nashi’s 
commissars and Putin at Zavidovo in July 2005 represent a powerful marketing tool at the 
organization’s disposal.  The organization was able to show its constituents the close 
relationship it had with a politician popular amongst those constituents.  Furthermore, the 
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organization’s adherents were able to identify with the prestige of their organization.  High 
morale is a useful tool in any mobilization capacity.  
    I have shown in this chapter how Nashi navigated the “multi-action field” in which it 
was situated in 2005, and how it formed, developed, and acted according to opportunities 
and constraints allowed by its environment and other actors in this field.  The increased 
prominence of Moving Together’s competitors due to more favorable conditions of the 
socio-political field challenged Moving Together’s mobilization.  Nashi formed in response 
to this competition, and the changed environment, which was colored by the events in 
Ukraine and Russia in late 2004 and early 2005.  I have shown how Nashi’s relationship to 
the state affects its mobilization, and how Nashi and the state both had a stake in reacting to 
the changed environmental factors and the perceived threats from rival youth organizations.  
    I have shown that Nashi’s close relationship to the state offered advantages to both the 
organization and the state itself. Thus, the relationship becomes symbiotic: the social 
movement organization moves itself into the orbit of a politician popular amongst its 
constituents in order to aid in the recruitment of them into adherents, and the state is able to 
count on the organization and its mobilization capacities in times of need, whether in a 
crisis situation of merely during routine electoral activity.  
    I wish now to turn to one other actor in this field and discuss how Nashi’s relationship to 
it affected its mobilization, and how Nashi worked within these opportunities and 
constraints: the media.  If a social movement organization wishes to expand its activity 
beyond its original pool of constituents, and to reach a wider audience to which it can make 
its claims, it will need the help of the media.  A social movement organization certainly 
possesses the ability to shape its marketing campaign in order to reach its constituents in 
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efforts to convert them to adherents.  However, as some point, its capacities become 
exhausted, and the role of the media becomes important.  Moreover, as an actor itself in the 
socio-political field, the media is in a position to affect positively and negatively a social 
movement organization’s mobilization.  It is to this interaction that I now turn.
Chapter 3 – Nashi and the Media: Promoting the Good, Mitigating the Bad, Avoiding 
the Ugly      
    “You should attentively pay attention to criticism in the press,” Natal’ia Timakhova, 
Head of the Administration of Press-Service for the President of the Russian Federation 
told the audience that gathered at the National Institute for Upper School Administration in 
November 2005 to hear a lecture titled “The Position of Public Action in the System of 
Mass Information.”  “Your task,” she advised attendees, among them one hundred and fifty 
Nashi commissars, “is to communicate in an open and honest dialogue,” with journalists 
“not only to defend your point of view, but also…to transmit [that point of view] to the 
people.”130  Following the public portion of the lecture, the commissars met privately with 
Timakhova to conduct a workshop on interacting with the press effectively.  Nashi’s own 
coverage of the event mused that “in the near future,” Nashi commissars will begin training 
for work in the presidential press-service.131  Nashi’s enthusiasm for the workings of the 
press system, and the way that public action is covered by the media, is not isolated to this 
single event.  To be sure, Nashi is keenly aware of the way that the media, as both an actor 
and an observer within the socio-political field, can influence, and be influenced by, others 
negotiating within the opportunities and constraints that affect political and social 
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mobilization.  I will discuss in this chapter how Nashi negotiated with the press in 2005, 
and how its interactions with the media aided its mobilization and its work to achieve its 
stated goals, and how the organization recognized the effect negative press coverage could 
have on its activities.  Nashi has since its inception constructed a media campaign designed 
to maximize positive coverage of its events, while minimizing negative portrayals, all the 
while demonstrating an acute understanding of the strengths and weakness, promises and 
pitfalls of the way the media covers the action of a social movement organization.  To a 
certain extent, press coverage is outside the control of an organization.  Therefore, a social 
movement organization’s media strategy is successful when it advances the organization’s 
agenda and reaches its constituents, the bystander public and adherents, while mitigating 
the effects of negative press coverage, which can aid its opponents, and alienate those same 
groups.  This internal and external use of the media for dissemination of information about 
its goals and activities, and its own image construction, is a key component of a social 
movement organization’s ability to mobilize.132
    I will detail Nashi’s media strategy while arguing that the attention the organization pays 
to the press is one of the components of its overall mobilization strategy.  However, before 
I discuss the specifics of Nashi’s interaction with the media, I need to first sketch out the 
ways that the press behaves as an actor in, and chronicler of, the socio-political field.  
    A social movement organization’s relationship with the media has two dimensions: the 
orientation of its actions and events to the characteristics of media coverage; and the 
attention a social movement organization pays to the ways it can influence and control 
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media coverage, while minimizing the negative effects of unfavorable treatment that are 
outside of its control.  One is based upon a passive, observing role played by the media, 
and the other recognizes that the media is at times an actor itself in the socio-political field, 
in addition to mere chronicler.  
    How do social movement organizations orient themselves towards the media?  The first 
way is by recognizing the limitations and characteristics of its coverage.  By its very nature, 
the media is event-oriented.  That is to say, coverage emphasizes action at the expense of 
context.133  With this in mind, social movement organizations must design their media 
strategies around events that attract media coverage, and simultaneously create their own 
context through actions and images.  One way the organization accomplishes this is by 
embedding its events with as much symbolism as possible, allowing the organization to 
transmit messages through images, symbols and brief slogans, thus providing a degree of 
context not conveyed by the media treatment.  This is often at the core of a socio-political 
actor’s broadcast media strategy, as broadcast media is the most context-deficient, and is 
largely limited to short, action-oriented segments. 
    While creating a media strategy that maximizes coverage and creates context can aid a 
social movement organization in its mobilization and in advancing its claims, there are 
limits with which the organization must contend.  Media coverage can also have a negative 
effect on a social movement organization, and the organization must include strategies for 
mitigating these effects in its overall media campaign.  Unfavorable editorial content or a 
negative slant in the portrayal of the organization in print and broadcast media can damage 
133
 Jenkins, 546.
67
the image of a social movement organization.134  Moreover, the media can provide “a 
biased and ridiculed picture of the movement, [obstruct] mobilization, and [influence] 
conflicts within the movement.135
    With these pitfalls in mind, a social movement organization’s strategy vis-à-vis event-
oriented media coverage is to plan and initiate events that will be interesting enough to 
attract coverage, without making those events so sensational as to negatively affect public
and media opinion.  If the events seem disruptive or illegitimate, public support for the 
organization may wane, as happened to Moving Together.136  The organization is thus 
constrained between the poles of media interest and potential public disaffection.  As 
Jenkins writes, a movement organization “must therefore walk the fine line between 
outlandishness (which alienates third parties but secures coverage) and conventionality 
(which may be persuasive but is ignored by the media).”137
    Another pillar of a social movement organization’s media strategy is its orientation 
towards media outlets that are more discourse-based and perhaps less action-oriented.   
This tends to be an orientation towards the print media, which, while certainly attracted to 
“newsworthy” events, can at times be involved in public discourse as much as it is in 
reporting the news.  Not only do they have editorial pages that take sides in political 
contests, but also print media outlets can base their story selection on issues their editorial 
boards or ownership groups wish to promote or limit.  
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    Print media in Russia is as much an actor in the socio-political field as it is a chronicler 
of that field.  The media landscape is often an arena in which political actors battle with 
one another, at times reducing a publication to little more than a mouthpiece for a political 
perspective.  This tendency has to do with the economic difficulties faced by Russian press 
outlets in the mid- to late-1990s, as well as the traditions of the press in Russia and the 
Soviet Union, where governmental agencies, trade unions and the Communist Party itself 
sponsored and controlled newspapers.  Even today, it is important to remember that 
“independent” publications have a political bias to them.  In Russia, an independent 
newspaper’s muckraking has little to do with the standards of the public good and seeks 
primarily “to influence the political elite” and advance the fortunes of its patrons.138  While 
at times these efforts coincide with the desires of mass opinion, that role is secondary.  It is 
common for political actors to purchase favorable coverage of events or activities, and the 
editorial tone of a newspaper is often designed to echo the perspective of a political or 
economic patron.  
    The media in this function represents a conduit through which socio-political actors 
work to affect and influence public discourse.139   This discourse is a way the public 
participates in discussions of political and social issues and is as much a part of political 
society as more electoral avenues, such as voting or party participation, or socio-political 
avenues, such as involvement with a social movement organization.  This discourse 
represents another arena in which social movement organizations must interact with the 
actors I have cited throughout this thesis: constituents, adherents, the bystander public and 
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opponents. A social movement organization’s relationship with the media is proactive and 
strategic, as it attempts to use the media as a conduit for disseminating its own views, at the 
same time recognizing that it must also contend with the efforts of opponents and other 
actors negotiating similarly with the media.  A social movement organization hopes that 
media coverage of its activities will rally constituents, the bystander public, and political 
and social elites to the efficacy of its claims, and away from the countering claims of its 
opponents.140
A. Nashi’s Media Strategy
From the outset, Nashi’s relationships and interactions with the media suggest that the 
organization’s leadership understands the role that press coverage can play in achieving its 
goals and positively affecting its mobilization capabilities.  The organization also seems to 
understand the varying strategies a social movement organization must employ to account 
for the divergent event and discourse orientations of different media agents.  Nashi’s first 
act was to use the media for self-identification and publicity.  Yakemenko announced the 
organization’s birth in a Moving Together press release issued on 1 March 2005, in which 
he briefly outlined the reasons he was leaving Moving Together in order to lead Nashi.  He 
also used the opportunity to quickly define Nashi’s attributes and cast the new 
organization’s opponents in a negative light.  This announcement represented the first shot 
in a salvo of media events and releases Nashi organized in the first two months of its 
existence.  The initial media campaign included interviews with national commissars, press 
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releases, publications and profiles, culminating with its first large scale events in spring and 
summer 2005, Our Victory and Seliger-2005, both of which were covered heavily by the 
Russian (as well as international) press.  
    Nashi proved to be savvy in using media to advance its goals of establishing its own 
identity and fostering an atmosphere conducive to its mobilization goals.  A good example 
of this practice was the Our Victory event in May 2005.  This event was large and 
grandiose and was guaranteed significant press coverage.  Cognizant of this, Nashi made 
sure to saturate the event with a heavy degree of symbolism that would immediately be 
recognizable to the bystander public and its constituents.  I wrote in chapter two that it was 
no accident that the first major event Nashi staged emphasized the organization’s supposed 
connection to the generation of the Great Patriotic War.  Not only was this connection 
crucial to the identity formation of the organization amongst its adherents, but it also served 
the same purpose towards the bystander public and its non-adherent constituents as well.  
Given that this event more than likely would be these actors’ first exposure to the 
organization, and that this exposure would come via media outlets, Nashi had to be sure 
that the message it wanted to convey, and the emotional linkage it sought to make between 
the generations, was embedded in the symbolically rich pageantry in context-deficient 
media coverage.  The flags resembling Tsarist-era naval banners, the images of Nashi 
commissars parading with veterans, and other elements of the event, in addition to serving 
the identity formation, were part of a media strategy that symbolically introduced the 
organization.  
    In the weeks surrounding the event, Nashi arranged for interviews with press outlets that 
sought further to drive home its primary themes in an effort to propagate itself.  
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Yakemenko and other national commissars granted interviews with print and television 
news sources at both the national and local level.  Among those outlets targeted by Nashi 
were Komsomlskaia pravda, a national tabloid known for covering topics of interest to 
youths.  Boris Yakemenko’s “The Path for Russia” was published in this paper in April 
2005.  Additionally, Vasilii Yakemenko and national commissar Natal’ia Lebedeva 
participated in a press conference at the newspaper’s headquarters.  Komsomol’skaia 
pravda in particular has covered Nashi in a favorable manner.  In addition to the press 
conferences and interviews noted above, the newspaper has published sympathetic 
accounts of Nashi’s founding conference and Seliger-2005.  The tone of these articles is 
generally favorable and positive, detailing aspects of Nashi’s program and activities, 
sometimes in language taken directly from Nashi’s publications.  
The choice of Komsomol’skaia pravda as the conduit for this media campaign was no 
accident, and hints at Nashi’s strategy for navigating the component of a movement 
organization’s media strategy that recognizes the media’s role in public discourse.  Beyond
the press’ role as a chronicler of a social movement organization’s activities is the 
recognition that the media is an actor itself in the socio-political field.  Some press outlets 
will be sympathetic to an organization, and some will ally themselves with an 
organization’s opponents.  In Komsomol’skaia pravda, Nashi has an ally in this field that 
allows Nashi to control the message it wishes to convey.
Komsomol’skaia pravda, originally the press organ of the Komosomol youth 
organization, became an independent media outlet following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  It advocated in its pages the democratic and economic reforms championed by the 
Yeltsin regime.  However, the paper balanced this support with its often-scathing criticism 
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of Yeltsin’s conduct of the first war in Chechnya.  Much of this began to change in the 
mid- to late-1990s, when the economic conglomerate OneksimBank purchased the 
newspaper in 1997.  After this acquisition, the newspaper’s critical coverage of the war in 
Chechnya waned, and the paper drifted towards a more tabloid-style format, its front pages 
filled with sensationalism.141  OneksimBank’s ownership of the newspaper seems to have 
softened the critical tone of its coverage, and reoriented its perspective towards a more 
conciliatory view of power, likely due to the desire of OneksimBank to curry favor with the 
Kremlin.  While it is difficult to ascertain with certainty what the newspaper’s relationship 
with Nashi is, it is reasonable to assume that this desire on the part of the publication to be 
non-confrontational with the political elite in Russia leads to its favorable coverage of 
organizations and events that are pro-regime.    
    Nashi compiles favorable press coverage of its events, grandiose and pedestrian, in a 
page on its web site called “NASHI in the System of Mass Information” (“NASHI v SMI”).  
Perhaps the most frequently updated page on its site, it serves several purposes.  The 
coverage the organization chooses stresses the events the organization carries out that it 
considers most important.  It allows the organization to disseminate information about itself 
in a positive light.  The site presents curious parties visiting the site with more than forty 
pages of positive press coverage focusing on national and local initiatives.  Moreover, the 
events Nashi chooses to include focus on the themes in which the organization places great 
import: whether it is images of Nashi marching with veterans, donating blood or other local 
and national initiatives the organization carries out.  
    Adherents visiting the site are able to see what their comrades throughout Russia are 
doing, down to the local level.  Not only can this foster morale amongst its adherents by 
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stressing the breadth of action Nashi carries out throughout the country, it also can foster 
cross-chapter participation in each other’s events, such as when several storonniki, or local-
level activists, from Voronezh read about a Nashi-sponsored picket against the governor of 
Perm’ and promptly set out to participate in the event.142
    Nashi does not care for all press coverage however.  Keen to mitigate the potentially 
damaging effect negative media coverage can have on a social movement organization, 
Nashi must contend with negative coverage in unsympathetic news outlets.  The reaction of 
the organization to unfavorable coverage is indicative of the sensitivity the group has 
towards its image in the media.  Among media sources that are unsympathetic to Nashi is 
Moskovskii komsomolets, a tabloid that is similar in scope and demographic to 
Komsomol’skaia pravda, but which has a much wider circulation.143 Moskovskii 
komsomolets was an independent and democratic publication in the early post-Soviet years 
that generally supported the Yeltsin regime, though with some caveats.  In the mid-1990s, 
it too changed the course and tone of its coverage, but in the opposite manner as 
Komsomol’skaia pravda.144 Moskovskii komsomolets criticized the Yeltsin administration 
harshly for its conduct of the war in Chechnya, and the oppositional tone has stayed with it 
to this day.  It managed to avoid being purchased during the media consolidation frenzy of 
the late 1990s and has positioned itself as the most widely read newspaper in Moscow, with 
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a daily-circulation above one million per day.145  The newspaper recently sought to expand 
its influence outside of Moscow by publishing regional editions in cities throughout the 
Russian Federation.  Due to its popularity, it has become something of a political force in 
the Russian capital, and, as Zassoursky claims, favorable or unfavorable coverage within its 
pages can “decide the fate of almost any electoral campaign in the city of Moscow.”146
With the money the newspaper is investing in its regional branches, it is clear that the 
newspaper hopes to expand that influence outside of the Russian capital.  
    One particular writer for Moskovskii Komsomolets, Mikhail Romanov, is especially 
skeptical of Nashi, regularly referring to its members as “Nashisti,” a sobriquet that sounds 
as similar to “fascist” in Russian as it does in English.  Romanov’s depictions of the 
organization in the numerous articles he wrote about the group in 2005 ranged from the 
mocking to inflammatory.  In an article titled “Putin Played a Dirty Trick on Nashi,” 
Romanov paints the organization as nothing more than naïve dupes that Putin is merely 
using for political support, all the while embarrassed by their slavish devotion.147  In a more 
serious tone, Romanov also publicized several incidents in which political activists across 
the political spectrum, from liberal chess champion Garry Kasparov to members of several 
youth communist organizations, reported being attacked by unknown assailants, whom 
they accused of being Nashi thugs.148  In the former, the attackers struck Kasporov over the 
head with a chessboard.  In the latter, Romanov reported that several young men wearing t-
shirts emblazoned with the Nashi logo attacked the leftist youths as they left a meeting in 
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north Moscow.  Romanov himself was allegedly the victim of Nashi violence, having been 
ejected from Nashi’s founding congress in late February 2005 and tossed into a snowdrift 
by several members of the organization, a charge Yakemenko has not completely denied.
    Romanov is not the only journalist from Moskovskii komsomolets to cover Nashi, but the 
frequency of his reports, their often-critical tone, and his association149 with Youth 
Yabloko leader Il’ia Yashin clearly touches a nerve within Nashi.  As such, Nashi targeted 
Moskovskii komsomolets for retribution for what it calls unfair coverage.  In late 2005, 
Nashi filed a suit against the newspaper, claiming that a Romanov-penned article the 
newspaper ran on 25 November 2005 was biased and slanderous.  Nashi argues that the 
article, which detailed an alleged secret plan to attack “ultra-rightists” on 27 November in 
Moscow, was published despite Yakemenko’s denials, and that the newspaper allies itself 
with anti-Nashi organizations such as the National Bolsheviks and Youth Yabloko.150
    The organization’s somewhat clumsy handling of negative press coverage indicates the 
sensitivity Nashi has towards its image in the media.  In addition to suing Moskovskii 
komsomolets, Nashi aggressively countered an interview Federation Council Speaker 
Sergei Mironov gave to Nezavisimaia gazeta in which Mironov strongly criticized the 
organization.  Mironov is generally supportive of Putin, though he did run against him in 
the 2004 presidential election.  His criticism of Nashi in Nezavisimaia gazeta was one of 
several attacks on Nashi made by Mironov himself and his own Party of Life in 2005, most 
of which intimated that Nashi’s activities were antithetical to a healthy political system and 
resembled those of Hitler Youth or the Black Hundreds, the reactionary organization active 
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in Russia after the 1905 Revolution.  His early criticism of Nashi in March 2005 may have 
been an attempt to stem Nashi’s growth before it had firmly established itself.  
    Yakemenko responded to the interview by calling the newspaper biased against Nashi, 
complaining it is an ill-informed, sensational and careless member of “the liberal press.” 
Publishing Mironov’s comments in the newspaper, Yakemenko continued, is typical of the 
“Boris Berezovskii-owned” Nezavisimaia gazeta, a reference to the exiled oligarch who 
has publicly clashed with the Putin regime.151  Berezovskii’s media group served as a 
particularly vocal political voice in the late 1990s, offering widespread favorable media 
coverage of Yeltsin’s economic and political programs.  Initially a supporter of Putin, 
Berezovksii’s increasingly vocal criticism of the second war in Chechnya and his political 
clout sparked a clash with Putin, whose administration began investigating Berezovskii’s 
widespread business holdings, leading to his eventual exile.  Nashi’s sensitivity to negative 
coverage suggests the organization is aware of the power that press coverage, positive and 
negative, can have in influencing constituents and the bystander public.  Nashi spends 
much energy cultivating a sympathetic portrayal while aiming to mitigate negative 
coverage, often by attacking the media outlet as biased or allied with anti-Nashi activists of 
organizations. 
    Perhaps the strongest case that can be made for the importance that Nashi gives to press 
image is that the organization seems determined not to repeat the mistakes of Moving 
Together in the media battle, much as it attempts to correct some of the deficiencies that 
organization had in relation to ideology.  Moving Together’s at times outrageous activities 
garnered a fair amount of press coverage, which initially was impressed with the ability of 
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the organization to mobilize large numbers of participants in its activities and sought to 
understand the motivations of the organization and its alleged links to the Putin 
administration.  However, as the organization’s activities got more outrageous, the press 
became more skeptical.  While stunts like filling a replica toilet bowl with copies of 
“pornographic” contemporary novels certainly fit the paradigm of what a media outlet 
tends to cover, the content of such activities potentially leads to alienation of third parties, 
audiences that a social movement organization hopes to influence.  Nashi seems to distance 
itself from its predecessor in this respect.  The heavy emphasis in the organization’s 
activities and events on images and symbols with positive connotations in Russian society, 
such as patriotism and the generation of the Great Patriotic War indicate that the 
organization’s leaders learned from Moving Together’s mistakes.  While the organization 
cannot avoid negative coverage completely, it can adopt a pro-active media policy designed 
to stress its strengths while minimizing its weaknesses. 
    In sum, a social movement organization such as Nashi must negotiate with the media 
within the wider socio-political field, and the strategies Nashi and similar organizations use 
to interact with the media are components of its overall mobilization apparatus.  Cognizant 
of the opportunities and pitfalls presented by media coverage, a social movement 
organization can design a media campaign that advances the perceptions and stresses the 
themes the organization wishes to propagate and allows the organization to seek a broader 
audience to whom it can emphasize those perceptions and themes.  It is also an avenue 
through which the organization interacts with its constituents, adherents and the bystander 
public in a competition for public opinion with its opponents, who are likewise waging a 
battle for perception in the press.  It is in the media that we find both the identity formation 
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that I outlined in chapter one, and the interaction within the socio-political field that I 
discussed in chapter two.  While Nashi’s media campaign has its weaknesses – the 
somewhat clumsy reaction to negative press outlets – overall it is an important component 
of its overall mobilization strategy, and a key element of its ability to advance its claims.
Conclusion
    I have shown in this thesis how Nashi orients itself within the socio-political field, how it 
constructed an ideology and identity to position itself within that field, and how its 
interactions within the field aid its ability to mobilize.  The corollary is that failure to 
navigate this field and appreciate the opportunities and constraints of that field can lead to a 
loss of prestige and mobilization capability among Russian youth movement organizations.  
My goal was to discuss the saliency of certain tactics and relationships for youth 
organizations in contemporary Russia.  
    In Nashi’s case, the success of its mobilization was, and to an extent still is, due to 
several factors.  The first is the organization’s ability to form a collective identity, which 
allows its adherents to define not only themselves and their own actions positively, but 
negatively identify their supposed opponents.  I argue that Nashi’s ability to create a salient 
ideology was one way that the organization managed to correct a weakness in Moving 
Together’s mobilization strategy.  An important component of this identity was the 
conflation of its members’ generation with that of their grandparents, the generation that 
defeated the Germans in World War II.  Nashi uses the identities created with documents 
like its manifesto to propagate these claims, and the actions the group undertakes stress the 
themes embedded in their collective identity.  This identity formation and its presence in its 
activities is a means for the organization not only to self-identify, but also to spread its 
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desired image among its constituents and the bystander public, a process which aids in its 
mobilization.  
    The second key to Nashi’s success is the organization’s ability to orient itself within a 
wider field of opportunities and constraints and its capacity to forge relationships within 
that field.  These relationships reap dividends for a social movement organization by 
providing it with resources for mobilization.  Also, the socio-political environment is 
important in the efficacy of an organization such as Nashi.  All of these variables contribute 
to the ability of social movement organizations like Nashi to mobilize effectively within the 
socio-political field.  Nashi’s activities are generally consistent with the frameworks 
offered by scholarship on social movement organizations and collective action.  I used 
these frameworks to examine Nashi’s activities within the socio-political field to gauge the 
strengths and weakness of its mobilization.  I noted the decline of Moving Together due to 
its inability to navigate successfully within this field and discussed Nashi’s attempts to 
avoid the mistakes made by Moving Together.  A key element of Nashi’s ability to 
mobilize in 2005 within this field is the organization’s relationship to the administration of 
Vladimir Putin.  In Nashi, the administration saw a vehicle through which it could cultivate 
a patriotic ideology amongst the young generation, perhaps in an attempt to foster 
sympathy among youth when so much attention had been given to anti-regime youth 
actions in Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia.  The links between Vasilii Yakemenko and 
Vladislav Surkov represent the most direct connection between the Nashi and the state, and 
it is via this relationship, I argued, that Nashi achieved a deal of prestige that allowed it to 
mobilize youths in its activities.
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    The third component of Nashi’s mobilization strategy is the organization’s interactions 
with the press.  The press is conduit through which a social movement organization can 
spread its message and reach its constituents and the bystander public and an avenue for 
boosting the morale of its adherents.  A social movement organization plans and executes 
its media campaign in order to spread its message and identity.  Due to certain 
characteristics of various media outlets, a social movement organization must have a 
diverse strategy for interacting with the media.  Due to broadcast media’s tendency to cover 
action-oriented events that lack context and discussion, Nashi must design events that will 
attract media attention and embed within those events the images and symbols its wishes to 
convey.  This is a way that the organization deploys the identities that I discussed in 
chapter one.  However, a social movement organization must recognize the dangers 
inherent in coverage-worthy events, and realize that if an event comes across as outrageous 
or illegitimate, then coverage can have a negative effect on an organization’s mobilization.  
Nashi again seeks to make up for the mistakes Moving Together made with several of its 
activities, which garnered press attention but also alienated the populations the organization 
hoped to influence.
    A social movement organization also must recognize that the media, especially in 
Russia, is an actor within the socio-political field, and due to this characteristic, it must 
initiate a media-strategy that fosters relationships with sympathetic press outlets, while 
mitigating the effects of skeptical or even hostile publications.  I showed how Nashi uses a 
newspaper with an interest in a positive relationship to allies of the Kremlin, 
Komsomol’skaia pravda, to disseminate the messages it wishes to its constituents, 
adherents, and the bystander public.  Moreover, the organization must contend with 
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unsympathetic actors who are using the media to define Nashi negatively.  Moskovskii 
komsomolets, an independent publication, and one reporter in particular, Mikhail Romanov, 
published several articles in 2005 that paint Nashi in a negative light, and Nashi’s reaction -
- suing the newspaper -- demonstrates the importance Nashi, like any social movement 
organization, places on media coverage.  Nashi’s especially aggressive response indicates 
that the organization is cognizant of its image in the press, and aware that part of Moving 
Together’s downfall was unfavorable coverage of its events and activities.
    A recurring theme throughout this thesis has been Nashi’s attempts to correct the 
supposed deficiencies of Moving Together, an organization that shared many of the same 
ideological orientations as Nashi, not to mention many of its leaders, in particular Vasilii 
Yakemenko.  Moving Together achieved notable mobilization success between 2000 and 
2003 but faded from importance due to its lack of salient ideology, a fall from grace within 
the Putin Administration due to its outlandishness, and the effects unfavorable press 
coverage had on the organization.  What all of this points to is the dynamic nature of the 
field of opportunities and constraints, that is, a social movement organization must 
constantly negotiate within that field, and adjust its collective action accordingly if its 
hopes to achieve sustained momentum.  What worked for Moving Together in 2001 was 
ineffective in 2004, and as such the organization declined in importance.  What I wish to 
stress is that the success of Nashi’s mobilization strategy was due to the characteristics of 
the field that were present in late 2004 and early 2005, as well as the influence of Moving 
Together’s decline, which revealed the mobilization liabilities of that organization.  Nashi 
was in a position to design its identity, ideology, programs and structure its relationships 
based in part on what worked and did not work for Moving Together.
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    These characteristics included support and patronage from the Putin Administration, the 
resonance that notions like patriotism had among Russian youth, and the presence of 
sympathetic media outlets, not to mention the then recent political fallout due to the Orange 
Revolution and the aftermath of the pension scheme debacle.  Due to Nashi’s negotiations 
within that field and the favorability of the environment, the organization was able to hold 
mass-action events, like Our Victory, as well as create strong and active local chapters that 
worked to achieve its stated goals at the local level.  So strong did the organization appear 
to be that President Putin himself endorsed Nashi, meeting with several commissars just 
days after the closing of the Seliger-2005 camp, and telling them that they represented the 
future leadership of the country.  
    There are signs that the success of Nashi’s strategy may be coming to an end, and these 
developments again underscore the dynamic nature of the socio-political field and the 
necessity of an organization to constantly negotiate within the field of opportunities and 
constraints, if its hopes to sustain its ability to mobilize large numbers of participants to 
achieve its goals.  Two events in March 2006 suggest that Nashi’s negotiations within this 
field may be threatened.  The first was the cancellation of a mass action carnival against 
racism and xenophobia the organization planned to hold in Moscow on 26 March 2006.  
According to Nashi, the postponement of the event until autumn 2006 was due to the 
inability of the organization to transport participants to Moscow from the regions and due 
to security concerns.152  For an organization that prided itself on its ability to mobilize 
youths from more than thirty regions to the Our Victory parade in May 2005, just months 
after its formation, this is a blow.  According to Kommersant, the cancellation is due not to 
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transportation and security problems but because of a lack of support within the Putin 
Administration for the event, which views Nashi’s attacks on “fascism” to be 
“overplayed.”153  Losing Kremlin support would be a hindrance to Nashi’s organizational 
capacities.  I have argued that the loss of Kremlin backing was a key component of Moving 
Together’s weakened momentum.  If the Kremlin has indeed turned its back on Nashi, it 
could indicate that the Putin Administration no longer regards a large-scale, “anti-fascist” 
youth organization to be a necessary component of its political base.  Having adjusted 
many of the measures taken to alter the pension scheme in January 2005, and with 
memories of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine fading, the Kremlin may not view an 
organization such as Nashi as necessary.  Alternatively, perhaps the Kremlin wishes to 
withhold a measure of support to keep Nashi compliant and under its control.  If, as 
Kommersant reported, the Kremlin considers Nashi’s focus on “fascism” to be 
“overplayed,” by turning attention towards alternative youth organizations, the Kremlin 
may be able to reign in some of Nashi’s supposed excesses that, if unchecked, could lead to 
public alienation of Nashi, much as happened to Moving Together, or it might lead to too 
much independent support, leaving the Kremlin with less control over the organization.  
Sensing a lack of support from the Kremlin, Nashi may tone down some of its rhetoric in 
an effort to curry favor with its patrons.
    Another recent development indicates that Nashi’s position as the most prominent socio-
political youth organization is threatened.  On 17 March 2006 in Vladivostok, the first 
congress of Nasha Strana (“Our Country”) convened, with representatives of thirteen 
regions of Russia’s Far East in attendance.  According to Nezavisimaia gazeta, the 
organization is the creation of the administration of Primorskii Krai and is financed by the 
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Far East’s fishing industry.  The governor of Primorskii Krai, Ser’gei Dar’kin, formerly 
was the president of the firm “Roliz,” and his contacts with his former colleagues in the 
industry reportedly secured financial support for the new organization.  In recent years, 
Dar’kin has increasingly allied himself with Vladimir Putin, who appointed him governor 
of the krai in 2005.154
    Nasha Strana issued an open invitation to the Kremlin administration to be present at the 
conference, and among those who attended were Nikita Ivanov, an official from the Putin 
Administration who in the past was linked to Nashi.155  Also attending was Aleksei 
Chadaev, author of the book Putin: His Ideology, which, according to Nezavisimaia gazeta,
garnered the praise of Vladislav Surkov.  The organization also invited representatives of 
Molodaia Gvardiia, the recently reformed youth wing of the United Russia Party.  Nasha 
Strana conspicuously did not invite representatives from Nashi, claiming that the expense 
of the tickets was prohibitive, an excuse that, given the attendance of representatives from 
the administration and Molodaia Gvardiia and the groups boasting of finances from 
numerous representatives in the fishing industry, seems dubious.  
    Nashi, for its part, stresses that there is no rivalry between the organizations.  The
group’s press secretary, Robert Shlegel’ told Nezavisimaia gazeta that the organization is 
“pleasantly surprised that a movement exists that agrees with us,” and that there is no need 
for competition because Nashi and Nasha Strana “are working in different regions.”156
From an organization that proclaims to be the “All Russian” youth organizations, and has 
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in the past repeatedly stressed the importance of working across the breadth of Russia, this 
is a striking admission.  Nashi issued announcements on its website detailing its desire to 
work in the future with Nasha Strana, as well as another recently formed organization 
Novie Liudi (“New People”), whose headquarters are in Volgograd.  Moreover, Nashi 
denied claims made in Gazeta.ru that Yakemenko was involved in a dispute with “curators 
from the Administration of the President” and was about to resign from Nashi.157
    Nashi’s denial of a rumored schism between Yakemenko and “curators” in the Kremlin 
raises the question of the importance that leadership plays in youth social movement 
organizations in contemporary Russia.  I wrote in chapter two about the resources Nashi 
possessed due to Yakemenko’s history with Moving Together and his relationship to 
Vladislav Surkov.  These experiences and connections proved to be an asset to Nashi’s 
mobilization in 2005.  The frameworks of social movement organizations and collective 
action I employed in this thesis stress leadership’s importance in the efficacy of an 
organization’s mobilization but classify it as one of many resources.  It might be the key 
component when speaking of such organizations in Russia, at least, pro-regime 
organizations.  Certainly, Nashi could not be classified as a grass roots, bottom-up 
organization; its leadership, and that leadership’s links to the Kremlin, was always at the 
forefront.  Threats to the prominence of that leadership then could severely handicap 
Nashi’s future mobilization to the extent that a strong collective identity and press strategy, 
other resources Nashi utilized for mobilization, may not matter.  If Yakemenko’s star has 
indeed fallen, it might then lead to Nashi’s demise or at least a decline in its ability to 
mobilize.
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    These developments represent challenges to Nashi’s strategy to mobilize youths towards 
its goals and indicate the changing socio-political field in which social movement 
organizations reside.  The sudden prominence of alternative youth organizations that seem 
to have the support of the Putin Administration suggests that the administration no longer 
sees Nashi as an appropriate vehicle through which it can nurture youth political support, or 
instead sees it as one of several organizations worth supporting for various reasons.  
Moreover, given that Molodaia Gvardiia, the youth wing of the United Russia Party, 
attended the founding congress of Nasha Strana and Nashi did not may indicate a shift in 
the perceived role that pro-government youth social movement organizations play from the 
perspective of the political elite.  It may be that the threat from a potential Orange 
Revolution-type event is no longer acute, and the administration is looking to support a 
youth organization that can better integrate young people into party politics, as opposed to 
simply mobilize them to stave off any sort of anti-regime mass actions.  Molodaia Gvardiia 
in the first months of its existence offered youths similar rhetoric and tactics as Nashi but 
its orientation to an established political party is a characteristic that Nashi cannot boast.  It 
is also possible that the Kremlin’s strategy is to nurture both organizations.  This strategy 
allows the Kremlin to cultivate a party-based youth organization that could be mobilized 
for political support in the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007 and 2008, while 
garnering the support of a more mass-action based group like Nashi in the event of an 
Orange Revolution-type situation.
    However, it is still too early to judge whether Nashi has lost the momentum it possessed 
in 2005.  Nashi may alter its strategies to take advantage of new conditions within the field 
of opportunities and constraints.  If Molodaia Gvardiia’s popularity grows, Nashi may 
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deduce that its best chance for survival would be to become a party organization.  The 
question of whether or not to link itself with electoral politics has always been near the 
surface, given the organization’s work under the auspices of United Russia conducting exit 
polls in the 2005 city council elections in Moscow and some of the workshops the group 
conducted at Seliger-2005.  It is also possible that Nashi will not modify its activities, after 
which it could indeed follow Moving Together into irrelevance.  Regardless of the fate of 
Nashi, youths represent an important constituency in contemporary Russian politics, and 
the Kremlin seems intent on achieving their support with its strategies centered on fostering 
patriotic sentiment, what Fish referred to as Putin’s “practical ideology,” or the lauding of 
concrete institutions “to build an inclusive sense of national belonging.”158
 This interest and involvement on the Kremlin’s part towards youth and youth 
organizations may be the most interesting facet in the consideration of socio-political youth 
movement organizations in Russia under Putin.  I used the frameworks provided by 
scholarship on social movement organizations and collective action in order to examine 
Nashi in contemporary Russia, and for the most part, these frameworks proved to be useful 
for analysis.  However, where Nashi differs from many of the organizations looked at in 
this field of study is that it is not a grass roots, bottom-up organization.  Instead, it is an
entity constructed by elite actors not involved in protests or mass-actions and it drew much 
of its initial strength from established resources and connections.  While I believe Nashi is 
subject to the forces of the opportunities and constraints that aid or inhibit a movement 
organization’s mobilization, I recognize that the decisive factor for pro-regime 
158 Fish, M. Steven.  “Putin’s Path.”  Journal of Democracy, 12:4 October 2001, 74.
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organizations in Russia, like Nashi, is likely to be whether or not that organization garners 
and sustains the support of the Kremlin leadership.  
    Nashi’s fortunes in 2006 and beyond may not hinge solely on its ability to navigate the 
field of opportunities and constraints, but also, or maybe primarily, on its relationship to 
one actor in particular in that field: the state.  Nashi’s future may depend on whether or not 
it fits into the plans that the Kremlin’s leadership has for interacting with and mobilizing 
youth for its own ends.  In this sense, the relationship between Nashi (and other Russian 
pro-regime youth organizations) and the Kremlin seems to fit into a wider trend of the 
Kremlin managing organizations and institutions in order to control them and mobilizing 
them if and when they need support in a given endeavor or event, whether this means 
participation in standard electoral politics, rallying sympathetic youths in a hypothetical 
Orange Revolution-type event, or staging a demonstration that stresses values the regime 
hopes to promote.  Nashi’s dependence on the patronage of the Kremlin is another example 
of the Russian state managing institutions and creating a top-down civil society that many 
scholars believe exists in contemporary Russia.  Other such examples include state control 
of press outlets, a structured party system, laws that govern and restrict the operations of 
non-governmental organizations, and the administration’s attacks on the oligarchs.  
    Regardless of the implications of Nashi’s rise in 2005 and its future, the activity of 
youths in organizations such as Nashi may have an effect on their future participation in 
politics.  Studies of youth participation in political organizations recognize the link between 
early, formative political activity, and future involvement in the political sphere.159  It could 
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be that the participation of a storonnik in Nashi’s activities in 2005 will lead to a life of 
political engagement, even if Nashi’s existence turns out to be relatively ephemeral. 
    One of the final campaigns Nashi undertook in 2005 was a blood drive called “NASHI 
Donory” (“Our Donors”).  Begun in Moscow, the campaign soon spread to seven other 
Russian cities.  Nashi was very proud of the event, repeatedly issuing press releases 
detailing the multitudes of commissars who signed up and participated.  The organization 
published several photos of its members, reclining in clinics throughout Russia, wearing 
their Nashi t-shirts, arms outstretched with needles protruding from their veins.  Whether 
Nashi manages to successfully navigate the socio-political field and continue the 
momentum it achieved in 2005, or if it fades into oblivion, it seems clear that one way or 
another, the Nashi Generation will find a way to give blood in service of their country.
91
Bibliography
Nashi Web Publications
“15 Maia patrioticheskaia atsiia ‘NASHA POBEDA,’”  
http://www.nashi.su/pravda/86597128
“Dvizhenie ‘NASHI’ dolzhno stat’ politicheshoi partiei?” 
http://www.nashi.su/sel/91952541
“Manifest molodozhnogo dvizheniia ‘Nashi,’” http://www.nashi.su/pravda/83974709.
“Moskva, 26 Iiulia – Prezident Rossii Vladimir Putin vstretilsia vo vtornik s 
predstaviteliami molodezhnogo dvizheniia “Nashi,”  
http://www.nashi.su/smi/93138578.
Moskva: ‘Nashi’ v gorode,” http://www.nashi.su/smi/86724533.
“NASHI’: 100 tysiach nabliudatelei – k 2008 gody!”  
http://www.nashi.su/work/104223010.
“NASH komissar Mikhail Kulikov: Pora rasstavit’ vse tochki nad ‘i!’”  
http://www.nashi.su/pravda/85865531.
“NASHI komissary proidut strazhirovku v press-sluzhbe Prezidenta RF,”
http://www.nashi.su/news/103086310.
“‘NASHI’ ne idut bez Putina,” Molodezhnoe Dvizhenie “NASHI,” g. Vladimir; 
http://www.nashi33.ru/index.php?subaction=showfull&id=1135697466&archive=&st
art_from=&ucat=6&
“‘NASHA POBEDA': Veterany peredali ‘NASHIM’ estafetu bor’by za nezavisimost’ 
Rossii.”  http://www.nashi.su/pravda/86659600.  
“‘NASHI’ podali v sud na ‘Moskovskii komsomolets;’” 
http://www.nashi.su/smi/103593675.
“‘NASHI’ realizovali unikal’nyi obrazovatel’nyi proekt – Vserossiiskii molodezhnyi lager’ 
‘Seliger – 2005;’” http://www.nashi.su/work/92814896.
“Zaiavlenie: V. Yakemenko v otvet na interv’iu S. Mironova v ‘Nezavisimoi gazette;’” 
http://www.nashi.su/pravda/83917409.
92
“Zaiavlenie komisarra Dvizheniia ‘NASHI’ Alekseia Mitriushina po povodu stat’i Il’I 
Barabanova, rameshchennoi na saite ‘Gazeta.Ru;’” 
http://www.nashi.su/news/112582007.
“Znai Nashikh!” http://www.nashi.su/pravda/84397501.
Other Russian Language Websites
“‘Iduschie vmeste’ noshli vroz;’” http://www.gazeta.ru/2005/03/16/oa_151394.shtml.
“Novoe molodezhnoe dvizhenie dolzhno stat’ siloi, kotoraia budet protivostoiat’ 
revoliutsii;” http://www.kreml.org/interview/80191430.
“Vasiliii Yakemenko: ‘Molodezh’ – eto effektivnyi instrument,” 
http://www.strana.ru/stories/05/08/25/3630/264232.html.
Barabanov, Il’ia, “Kak ‘Nashi’ provodiat leto,” 
http://www.gazeta.ru/2005/07/13/oa_163819.shtml.
English-Language Websites
“Analysis: 'The Burden Of Maintaining The State Has Been Laid On Our Shoulders;’”
            http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2005/russia-050209-
rferl01.htm.
Five Priorities of Our Generation,” http://www.yabloko.ru/Union/MMYA/five.html.
“Gov’t gives $17.5m for patriotic education;” 
http://top.rbc.ru/english/index/shtml?/english/2005/07/19/19120014_bod.shtml
“The Hunt for a National Idea,” by Julian Evans.  Eurasian Home. 
http://www.eurasianhome.org/en/?/en/comments/authors/author5/10.  
“Nashi Supporters Pack Leninsky Prospekt;” 
http://www.brandcount.ru/eng/news/nashi.shtml.
“‘Our People’ Stand Up for Putin,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/europe/4491633.stm, 4-28-05.
“The President of Russia,” http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/subj/22172.shtml
“Putin’s Performance in Office,” Levada Center; http://www.russiavotes.org.
93
“Putin’s Youth Rough Up Critic,” 
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/Focus/GC08Dh02.html.
“Russian Pro-Kremlin Youth Group Stages Mass Patriotic Rally in Moscow,” 
http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/05/16/nashakt.shtml.
“Speigel Interview with Kremlin Boss Vladislav Surkov: ‘The West Doesn’t Have to Love 
Us;’” http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/spiegel/0,1518,361236,00.html.
“A Talk with Putin’s Inside Man,” Business Week Online, 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/oct2002/nf20021021_0216.htm.
“Vladislav Surkov’s Secret Speech: How Russia Should Fight International Conspiracies,” 
http://www.mosnews.com/interview/2005/07/12/surkov.shtml.
“Voter Turnout in March Election,” FOM: Public Opinion Foundation (Russia), 
http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/civil_society/elections/presidential_electio
ns/voter_turn_2004/ed041231 
Corwin, Julie A., “Analysis: Walking With Putin,” Radio Free Liberty, 2 March 2005.  
http://www.ncsj.org/AuxPages/030205RFERL_Putin.shtml.
---------, “Russia: ‘A Youth Movement Needs A Leader.’” Radio Free Liberty.  21 April 
2005.  http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticleprint/2005/04/9ea4ff48-d348-4624-8203-
64cf632aae48.html.  
---------, “Russia: Are Soccer Hooligans Being Used By Kremlin?” 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/09/e107c9f7-58e0-48e9-9112-
31a1b90c0dab.html.
Evans, Julian, “The Hunt for a National Idea,” 
http://www.eurasianhome.org/en/?/en/comments/authors/author5/10.
---------, “How Putin youth is indoctrinated to foil revolution,” Times Online, 18 July 2005.  
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1698334,00.html.
Gudkov, Lev, “The Fetters of Victory,” first published in Neprikosnoyennij Zapas 40.  
http://eurozine.com/pdf/2005-05-03-gudkov-en.pdf.
Lavel, Peter, “RP’s Weekly Experts’ Panel: “Nashi” – building civil society or a Kremlin 
jackboot?” http://www.untimely-thoughts.com/index.html?art=1899.
Rosenburg, Steve, “Russia Launches Patriotism Drive,” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4698027.stm.
94
Torbakov, Igor, “Rebirth of Agitprop: Russia’s Spending on Patriotic Propaganda Will 
Triple,” 
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=407&issue_id=3411
&article_id=2370052 
Russian Newspaper Articles
Borsobin, Vladimir, “170 tysiach boitsov gotovy k novoi russkoi revoliutsii,” 
Komsomol’skaia pravda, 15 March 2005.
Il’in, Sergei, “‘Nashi’ sobiraiiut sily na Seligere,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, 21 July 2005.
Melikova, Natal’ia, “Plodites’ i pazmnozhaites’. Molodezhnym organizatsiiam ustroili 
tarakan’ i bega;” Nezavisimaia gazeta. 14 March 2006.
Moshkin, Mikhail, “Politika: oprichniki protiv dzhedaev,” Moskovskii komsomolets, 1 
March 2005.
Romanov, Mikhail, “Brednoe poboishche,” Moskovskii komsomolets, 31 August 2005.
---------, “Dzhoker, marsh pod kover!” Moskovskii komsomolets, 25 November 2005.
---------, “Gagarin by skazal: ‘Priekhali,’” Moskovskii komsomolets, 16 April 2005.
---------, “Kasparova odolela doska,” Moskovskii komsomolets, 18 April 2005.
---------, “Mordoi v sugrov,” Moskovskii komsomolets , 28 February 2005.
---------, “‘Nashi’ orysilis’,” Moskovskii komsomolets, 28 October 2005.
---------, “Putin polozhil ‘NASHIM’ svin’iu,” Moskovskii komsomolets, 28 July 2005.
---------, “Putin revoliutsii ne boitsia,” Moskovskii komsomolets, 18 July 2005.
Sergeeva, Iuriia, “Krasno-Belaia revoliutsiia,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, 20 May 2005.
Solomin, Vasiliii, “Komissary Seligera,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, 15 July 2005.
English-Language Newspaper Articles and Translations
Boykewich, Stephen, “Mironov’s Power of Life Criticizes Nashi,” Moscow Times, 29 
August 2005.
95
O’Flynn, Kevin, “Putin tries to enlist rockers against revolution,” Sunday Telegraph, 3 
April 2005.
---------, “Rock Stars Recruited to Fight Revolution’” The Moscow Times, 31 March 2005.
---------, “Wanted: Along with their political naivety, the Nashites all had a fresh, innocent 
look about them, as if they were on a school camping trip;” Moscow Times, 10 
February 2006. 
Schreck, Carl, “Luzhkov Aims to Harness City’s Soccer Fandom,” Moscow Times, 23 
August 2005.
Savina, Ekaterina, “Nashi Stopped from Moving,” Kommersant, 14 March 2006.
Articles
Baev, Pavel K.  “The Evolution of Putin’s Regime: Inner Circles an Outer Walls.”  
Problems of Post-Communism, 51:6 November/December 2004; 3-13.
Colton, Tomothy J. and Michael McFaul.  “Russian Democracy Under Putin.”  Problems of 
Post-Communism, 50:4  July/August 2003; 12- 21.
Diuk, Nadia.  “The Next Generation.”  Journal of Democracy, 15:3 July 2004; 59-66.
Fish, M. Steven.  “Putin’s Path.”  Journal of Democracy, 12:4 October 2001; 71-78.
Hale, Henry E.  “Civil Society from Above?  Statist and Liberal Models of State-Building 
in Russia.”  Demokratizatsiya, 10:3 Summer 2002; 306-321.
Henn, Matt, Mark Weinstein and Sarah Forrest.  “Uninterested Youth?  Young People’s 
Attitudes towards Party Politics in Britain.”  Political Studies, 53 2005; 556-578.
Herd, Graeme P.  “Colorful Revolutions and the CIS: ‘Manufactured’ Versus ‘Managed’ 
Democracy?”  Problems of Post-Communism, 52:2 March/April 2005; 3 -18.
Hooghe, Marc, Dietlind Stolle and Patrick Stouthuysen.  “Head Start in Politics: The 
Recruitment Function of Youth Organizations of Political Parties in Belgium 
(Flanders).”  Party Politics, 10:2 193-212.
Jenkins, J. Craig. “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements.”  
Annual Review of Sociology, 9 1983.  
Kurilla, Ivan.  “Civil Activism Without NGOs: The Communist Party as a Civil Society 
Substitute.”  Demokratizatsiya  Summer 20002, 10:3, 392-400.
96
Kuzio, Taras.  “From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and 
the Orange Revolution.”  Problems of Post-Communism, 52:2 March/April 2005; 29 -
44.
Markowitz, Fran.  “Not Nationalists: Russian Teenagers’ Soulful A-politics.”  Europe-Asia 
Studies, 51:7 November 1999; 1183-1198.
McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A 
Partial Theory.”  The American Journal of Sociology 82:6 May 1977, 1217-8.
Meyer, David S. and Debra C. Minkoff.  “Conceptualizing Political Opportunity.”  Social 
Forces, 82:4 June 2004; 1457-1492.
Riggs, Jonathan W. and Peter J. Schraeder.  “Russia’s Political Party System as a 
(Continued) Impediment to Democratization: The 2003 Duma and 2004 Presidential 
Elections in Perspective.”  Demokratizatsiya, Winter 2005, 13:1, 141-151.
Russell, Andrew.  “Political Parties as Vehicles of Political Engagement.”  Parliamentary 
Affairs, 58:3 2005; 555-569.
Shevtsova, Lilia.  “Russia’s Hybrid Regime.”  Journal of Democracy, 12:4 October 2001; 
65-70.
Squier, John.  “Civil Society and the Challenge of Russian Gosudarstvennost.”  
Demokratizatsiya, 10:2 Spring 2002; 166-182.
Umland, Andreas.  “Toward an Uncivil Society?  Contextualizing the Decline of Post-
Soviet Russian Parties of the Extreme Right Wing.”  Demokratizatsiya  Summer 2002 
10:3, 362-391.
Weigle, Marcia A.  “On the Road to the Civic Forum: State and Civil Society from Yeltsin 
to Putin.”  Demokratizatsiya, 10:2 Spring 2002; 117-146.
Zorkaia, Natalia, and Nadia M. Diuk.  “Values and Attitudes of Young Russians.”  Russian 
Social Science Review, 45:5 September – October 2004; 4-27.
Books
Marx, Gary T. and Douglas McAdam.  Collective Behavior and Social Movements: 
Process and Structure.  Englewood Cliff, NJ:  Prentice- Hall, Inc. 1994.
McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on 
Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
97
McAdam, Douglas, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly.  Dynamics of Contention.  
Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2001.
McFaul, Michael.  Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to 
Putin.  Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001.
Melucci, Alberto.  Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in 
Contemporary Society.  John Keane and Paul Mier, eds.  Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1989.    
Tilly, Charles.  From Mobilization to Revolution.  New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing 
Company, 1978.
Other Resources
“Infiltrators Share Pro-Kremlin Youth Camp Experience on Russia TV,” REN Television, 
18 July 2005.  BBC Monitoring Reports.  Transcript of program obtained from 
LexisNexis Academic.
